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ISSP Data Report
Religious Attitudes and Religious Change
Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt (eds.)
Das International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) erhebt jährlich Umfragedaten zu sozialwissenschaftlich relevanten 
Themen. Der vorliegende ISSP Data Report – Religious Attitudes and Religious Change beruht auf ISSP-Daten, die 
zu drei verschiedenen Zeitpunkten innerhalb von 17 Jahren in bis zu 42 Mitgliedsländern zu Einstellungen gegenüber 
Kirche und Religion im weitesten Sinne gesammelt wurden. Jedes Kapitel wurde von unterschiedlichen Autoren der 
ISSP-Gemeinschaft geschrieben und beleuchtet mit Hilfe der ISSP-Daten spezielle Aspekte religiöser Einstellungen 
und religiösen Wandels im internationalen Vergleich. In der Gesamtschau ergeben sich sowohl Einblicke in das religiöse 
Leben verschiedener Länder, als auch insbesondere Erkenntnisse zu den Einflussfaktoren religiösen Wandels innerhalb 
von fast zwei Dekaden.
The annual survey of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) provides data on topics relevant in social 
research. This current ISSP Data Report – Religious Attitudes and Religious Change examines data collected at three 
different points over 17 years, from up to 42 ISSP member countries, covering various facets of respondents’ attitudes 
towards Church and Religion. Individual chapters were written by different members of the ISSP community thereby 
offering a cross-national, comparative perspective on particular aspects of religious attitudes and religious change 
via ISSP data. Overall, this report offers insights into the religious landscapes of various countries and in particular 
information about the factors influencing the process of religious change over the past two decades.
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Introduction
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a coordinated effort encompassing 
research institutes from currently 48 countries around the world. ISSP annual surveys 
are designed to cover a variety of topics highly relevant to social science research and 
the data obtained is in high demand among the social sciences research community. The 
ISSP Data Report series represents an attempt to reach out to an audience beyond this 
traditional group of ISSP data users. Data Reports are designed to establish an under-
standing of the research value of ISSP data among social scientists at large, as well as 
among external users from other research areas, including students. The first ISSP Data 
Report – Attitudes towards the Role of Government was published in 2010 in the GESIS 
Schriftenreihe (GESIS Scientific Series) and was based on data obtained from the four 
ISSP modules 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006. 
This second volume of the ISSP Data Report focusing on Religious Attitudes and 
Religious Change is based on the three modules on Religion dating from 1991, 1998, 
and 2008. Six authors, all closely connected to the ISSP, wrote chapters on religion-
related topics for this volume, with most of them based on ISSP data covering a time 
span of almost 20 years. Tom W. Smith authored the first chapter in which he depicts 
and explains general trends of personal belief in God. As belief in God is one of the most 
general measures of religiosity available, Smith’s analyses draw a good basic picture of 
the overall ‘religious landscape’ across ISSP member countries. The second chapter offers 
Jonas Edlund’s examination of the extent to which cross-national variation in religious 
faith can be explained by a country’s level of social inequality. In Chapter 3 Franz Höl-
linger presents and interprets the development of church attendance from the middle 
of the 20th century to the present. He provides a look at trends in church attendance in 
Christian societies against the background of decreasing church attendance among many 
Western societies; usually read as an indication of the decreasing relevance of religion 
in everyday life. Insa Bechert’s contribution in Chapter 4 aims to shed light on the issue 
of whether religious people are happier than non-religious people. In the fifth chapter 
Wolfgang Jagodzinski addresses the question to what extent the societal processes of 
modernisation or of religious competition can explain the different trends in religiosity 
that the data display for different countries. These five chapters are followed by a metho-
dological note by the editors that examines a different set of cumulated data: the ISSP 
standard background variable “church attendance” in a timeline covering the 25 years 
between 1985 and 2010 across the six countries participating in the ISSP from the very 
beginning: Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the USA.1
In the five chapters of this report for all of the analyses that compare points in 
time, a cumulated dataset was used (GESIS Data Archive identification number: ZA5070, 
doi:10.4232/1.10860). This dataset joins the individual datasets of the ISSP modules 
1 The editors would like to thank Thomas Rahlf from the GESIS Data Archive for the Social 
Sciences for his great help with the graphical illustrations. 
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from 1991, 1998, and 2008; and allows for very convenient comparisons across these 
three modules. It contains only those country samples, and only those variables of the 
original datasets, which occur in at least two of the three individual modules, and which 
could be sufficiently harmonised to make valid comparisons. Thus, it collects data from 
28 different countries.2 The list of cumulated variables can be found in Appendix A.I; 
further information on the cumulated data file is offered by a guideline document in 
Appendix A.II. The individual datasets of ISSP 1991 (ZA2150), ISSP 1998 (ZA3190) and 
2008 (ZA4950) have been used in different chapters as well, reporting results from up to 
42 countries surveyed on this module topic. The countries‘ participation in the Religion 
modules is illustrated in the map on the following page. For a comprehensive overview 
of ISSP member countries and module participation see Appendix A.VI. The full list of 
topical modules is given in Appendix A.V.
There is a basic ISSP rule which has been followed over the series of all ISSP modules 
that at least two thirds of the module questions are repeated from the previous instance 
of the same topical module, while the remaining questions may be replaced or changed. 
Such changes can either be methodological adjustments, or they can address entirely 
new topical areas under the respective module heading. Also for 2008 several new items 
were included, focusing on issues such as tolerance towards other religions and mem-
bers of other religions. The complete basic questionnaire for ISSP 2008 is published in 
Appendix A.III.
Access to the data and methodological information on all the data used here is availa-
ble free of charge through the GESIS website at http://www.gesis.org/issp. The online 
portal of the GESIS Data Archive, ZACAT, allows for online analysis and downloading 
of the data, at http://zacat.gesis.org. More information on using ZACAT can be found in 
Appendix A.IV.
Further related materials, including a comprehensive bibliography of research work 
using ISSP data, can be found on the official ISSP website, at http://www.issp.org.
Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt
2 Germany is counted as one country, although the authors usually distinguish separate samples 
for East and West Germany in the Data Report.
GESIS Series  |  Volume 13 9
 ISSP Data Report
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
hi
ch
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
ed
 o
nc
e 
in
 a
n 
IS
SP
 R
el
ig
io
n 
m
od
ul
e
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
hi
ch
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
ed
 t
w
ic
e 
in
 a
n 
IS
SP
 R
el
ig
io
n 
m
od
ul
e 
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
hi
ch
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
ed
 in
 a
ll 
th
re
e 
IS
SP
 R
el
ig
io
n 
m
od
ul
es
Co
un
tr
ie
s´
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 IS
SP
 R
el
ig
io
n 
m
od
ul
es

GESIS Series  |  Volume 13 11
Authors
Insa Bechert
Insa Bechert works as a research assistant at the GESIS Data Archive for the Social 
Sciences in Cologne for the ISSP. She studied Sociology, English Philology and Anglo-
American History in Cologne (Germany). Her main field of research is the comparability 
of sociological measurement instruments in international research.
Jonas Edlund
Jonas Edlund is Professor of Sociology at the University of Umeå in Sweden. Since 
2004 he is the head of the Swedish ISSP. His field of research is the comparative study 
of socio-political belief systems revolving around taxation, redistribution, and social 
justice in relation to social stratification.
Franz X. Höllinger
Franz X. Höllinger is Professor of Sociology at the University of Graz (Austria) and takes 
part in the ISSP since 1986. His main teaching and research foci are methods of empiri-
cal research, sociology of religion, sociology of family and inter-ethnic relations. 
Wolfgang Jagodzinski
Wolfgang Jagodzinski is Professor of Sociology at the University of Cologne and Am-
bassador of his University to Japan. As the Director of the Central Archive for Empirical 
Social Research (ZA) in Cologne (now GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences) from 
1994 to 2007 and the President of GESIS from 2007 to 2008 he was a member of the 
ISSP. His main research interest is comparative sociology with a particular focus on 
culture and religion. 
Markus Quandt
Markus Quandt is head of the Research Data Center “International Survey Programmes” 
at GESIS and is in charge of data integration for several large comparative surveys at 
the GESIS Data Archive. He has worked in the areas of attitude measurement, measure-
ment equivalence in international surveys, data harmonisation processes, and political 
participation and electoral behaviour. He has been involved with the ISSP since 2004.
Tom W. Smith
Tom W. Smith is Senior Fellow and director of NORC’s Center for the Study of Politics 
and Society at the University of Chicago. Since 1980 he has been Director of the General 
Social Survey (GSS) in the USA. Tom W. Smith is one of the founders of the ISSP and 
was Secretary General from 1997 to 2003. His research interests include the sociology of 
religion, societal change, and survey methodology.

GESIS Series  |  Volume 13 13
Beliefs about God across Time and Countries
Tom W. Smith
Introduction
In 1966 the cover of Time magazine (April 8) asked the provocative question, “Is God 
Dead?” Three years later Time’s cover (December 26, 1969) raised a new query, “Is God 
Coming Back to Life?” Social scientists have also waivered back and forth about the 
global state of religion and its likely future (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008). Standard secu-
larization theory has argued that societies become less religious as they develop with 
education and the rise of science undermining both religious belief and religious prac-
tices (Kay, 1997; Voas, 2009). Others, while still finding a shift to secularization with 
development, have modified standard secularization theory. Norris and Inglehart (2011) 
argue that development reduces “existential insecurity” and this in turn lessens the 
demand for (or need for) religion. Others have argued that religion has been undergoing 
and will continue to undergo a transformation (such as a rise in spirituality alongside a 
weakening of organized religion, Smith, 2009), but not a clear decline. Still others see 
little secularizing trends (Greeley, 2003). The so-called supply-side school emphasizes 
the enduring demand for religion (Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000).
This paper focuses on one central, but relatively neglected, aspect of secularization 
and religious change, belief in God (Kay, 1997; Norris and Inglehart, 2012; Smith, 2009; 
Ziebertz, 2002). The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) has asked three ques-
tions focusing on belief in God (Appendix). The first covers six levels of belief which can 
be characterized as 1) atheists, 2) agnostics, 3) deists, 4) waivers, 5) weak believers, and 
6) strong believers. The second question asks about changes in belief in God over the life 
course and consists of consistent atheists, current atheists – but former believers, current 
believers – but former atheists, and consistent believers. The third question is an agree/
disagree item asking about belief in a personal God (i.e. “a God who concerns himself 
with every human being personally”).  
The ISSP Religion studies covered 18 countries in 1991 (counting East and West Ger-
many and Northern Ireland and Great Britain separately), 33 countries in 1998, and 42 
countries in 2008. This paper analyses the 30 countries that were in at least two of the 
three ISSP rounds and appear in the 1991-2008 merged ISSP Religion file created by 
GESIS. The data for the analyses is weighted.
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Cross-national rankings of belief in God 
Figure 1 shows the rank in 2008 on atheism (listed from high to low) and strong belief in 
God. Atheism ranges from 52% in the former East Germany to less than 1% in the Philip-
pines. Strong belief shows largely the reverse pattern falling from 84% in the Philippines 
to 4% in Japan (and second lowest at 8% in East Germany). Countries with high atheism 
(and low strong belief) tend to be ex-Socialist states and countries in northwest Europe. 
Countries with low atheism and high strong belief tend to be Catholic societies, espe-
cially in the developing world, plus the United States, Israel, and Orthodox Cyprus. In the 
case of Poland, it appears that its strong Catholicism trumps the secularizing influence 
of Socialism. There is also evidence that religious competition and/or religious conflict 
may stimulate higher belief. Belief is high in Israel which of course has a sharp conflict 
between Judaism and Islam, in Cyprus which is divided along religious and ethnic lines 
into Greek/Orthodox and Turkish/Muslim entities, and in Northern Ireland which is split 
between Protestant and Catholic communities and shows much higher belief levels than 
the rest of the United Kingdom. In the United States there is relatively little overt reli-
gious conflict, but intense religious competition across both major religions and denomi-
nations within Christianity. The one country that shows a low association between the 
level of atheism and strong belief is Japan. Japan ranked lowest on strong belief, but also 
in the lower half on atheism. Japan is distinctive among countries in having the largest 
number of people (32%) in the middle categories of believing sometimes and the agnos-
tic, not knowing response. This pattern is consistent with a general Japanese response 
pattern of avoiding strong, extreme response options (Smith, 2004).
GESIS Series  |  Volume 13 15
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Figure 1: Atheism and strong belief in God 2008
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Figure 2 shows attitudes in 2008 about changes in belief in God over time. The yellow 
dots show consistent atheists running from a high of 59% in East Germany down to 2% 
in Poland. The blue crosses show consistent believers ranging from 13% in East Germany 
to 94% in the Philippines. The reversed rankings are quite similar across almost all coun-
tries and closely match the pattern shown about belief in God in Figure 1.
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Figure 3 shows that the percent of respondents believing in a personal God (“who con-
cerns himself with every human being personally”) rises from 8% in East Germany to 
92% in the Philippines. Once again the rankings closely follow those in Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure 4 combines the three measures of beliefs about God in one index. The blue crosses 
indicate strong, traditionalist believers on all three questions - those certain that God 
exists who have always believed in God and who strongly agree that there is a personal 
God. The yellow dots indicate the opposite group, strong atheists - those who don’t 
believe in God, who have never believed in God, and who strongly disagree that there 
is a personal God. Strong believers range from 60% in the Philippines down to 2.5% in 
East Germany, while strong atheists run from almost none (0.1%) in the Philippines to 
46% in East Germany.
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Changes in belief in God over time
Changes in belief in God have generally been modest in magnitude, but belief has tended 
to diminish over time. As Table 1A shows, the percentage of those saying they were athe-
ists increased in 15 of 18 countries from 1991 to 2008 with an average increase of 1.7 
percentage points. For 1998 to 2008, the number of atheists grew in 23 of 30 countries 
for an average gain of 2.3 points. Conversely, as Table 1B indicates, certain belief in 
God declined in 15 of 18 countries from 1991 to 2008 with an average decrease of 2.4 
points and from 1998 to 2008 losses occurred in 23 of 30 countries for a similar average 
decline of 2.3 points. Likewise, Table 1C shows that never believing in God rose in 14 of 
17 countries from 1991 to 2008 for an average increase of 1.6 points and increased in 19 
of 29 countries from 1998 to 2008 by an average gain of 2.2 points. As Table 1D indi-
cates, the decline in belief in a personal God was somewhat weaker. From 1991 to 2008 
it fell in 10 of 18 countries for an average drop of 0.7 points. For 1998 to 2008 belief in 
a personal God declined in 19 of 30 countries by an average of 1.9 points.
From 1991 to 2008, Israel, Russia, and Slovenia showed consistent movement towards 
greater belief (i.e. less atheists, less people never having believed in God, and more 
agreeing that there is a personal God). Five countries had a mixed pattern with some 
measures moving towards and some away from belief (West Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
the Philippines, and the United States). Ten countries showed consistent decline in belief 
(Australia, Austria, East Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Northern Ireland, Norway, and Poland). For 1998 to 2008 five countries (West Germany, 
Israel, Japan, Russia, and Slovenia) showed consistent growth in belief. Nine countries 
(Denmark, East Germany, Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Switzer-
land, and the United States) had a mixed pattern with movement (mostly small) in oppo-
site directions. Sixteen countries showed decreases in belief on all measures.
While Russia and Slovenia showed consistent movement towards greater belief, coun-
ter to some other evidence of a general religious “revival” among ex-Socialist states 
(Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Smith, 2009), there is no general increase in belief in the 
former Soviet bloc. Across the four measures of change and eight countries, 12 showed 
movement in the religious direction and 20 away from belief. Most of the changes in 
either direction were small.
For Israel the religious shift may reflect the growing size of the orthodox Jewish and 
right-wing population and the relative decline of the more secular and leftist segment 
in Israeli society (Rebhun and Waxman, 2004). The original Zionist movement that re-
established Israel was of course “religious” since it was a “Jewish” movement, but the 
movement had a strong secular and Socialist component to it. That orientation seems 
to have diminished in recent decades and been supplanted by a more overtly religious 
perspective.
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Table 1: Changes in belief in God over time
A B C D
% Atheist % Certain that God exists
% Never believed 
in God
Agrees that God 
personally concerned 
with people
1991-
2008
1998-
2008
1991-
2008
1998-
2008
1991-
2008
1998-
2008
1991- 
2008
1998- 
2008
Australia + 7.3 + 6.4 - 5.1 - 1.6 + 10.3 + 8.9 - 9.1 - 7.7
Austria + 5.1 + 2.0 - 6.5 -10.6 ---- ---- - 9.3 - 4.7
Chile ---- + 0.1 ---- - 1.0 ---- + 0.0 ---- - 1.6
Cyprus ---- + 0.3 ---- - 6.0 ---- + 1.5 ---- -11.5
Czech Republic ---- +18.4 ---- - 6.8 ---- +18.6 ---- - 5.0
Denmark ---- + 3.4 ---- - 0.4 ---- - 1.6 ---- - 8.3
France ---- + 5.6 ---- - 5.8 ---- + 3.3 ---- - 7.8
Germany-East + 3.4 - 1.7 - 1.4 - 1.5 + 9.9 + 3.1 - 2.6 - 4.0
Germany-West + 0.1 - 1.9 - 0.6 + 3.3 + 0.1 - 3.5 + 0.7 + 0.9
Great Britain + 7.8 + 8.1 - 6.4 - 4.7 + 8.4 + 6.8 - 5.5 - 2.2
Hungary + 2.9 + 1.0 - 7.0 - 2.9 + 2.7 + 1.4 + 3.7 + 4.0
Ireland + 3.0 + 2.4 - 15.4 - 0.7 + 2.7 + 2.1 - 7.4 - 7.7
Israel - 9.6 - 1.8 +23.0 + 6.7 - 9.7 - 3.8 +20.4 + 2.8
Italy + 3.2 + 1.7 -10.5 - 6.7 + 3.5 + 3.5 + 0.8 - 1.3
Japan ---- - 1.8 ---- + 0.4 ---- - 1.5 ---- + 2.7
Latvia ---- + 9.1 ---- - 1.1 ---- +10.6 ---- - 2.7
Netherlands + 3.7 + 2.6 - 3.3 - 5.0 + 4.2 + 3.8 - 3.4 - 4.4
New Zealand + 4.9 + 4.8 - 2.5 - 4.0 + 8.8 + 8.5 - 4.1 - 2.5
Northern Ireland + 5.1 + 3.0 -15.2 - 4.9 + 3.3 + 0.6 -14.2 - 2.1
Norway + 7.9 + 5.8 - 4.7 - 3.5 + 8.3 + 5.9 - 5.8 - 1.1
Philippines + 0.3 + 0.1 - 2.2 + 5.5 + 0.2 - 0.8 + 2.9 + 3.7
Poland + 1.3 + 1.0 - 5.0 - 5.5 + 1.1 + 0.4 - 3.7 + 0.5
Portugal ---- + 2.7 ---- - 9.4 ---- + 2.0 ---- -16.2
Russia -11.7 -11.7 +17.3 + 6.9 -25.5 -16.7 +19.1 + 9.3
Slovakia ---- + 0.7 ---- - 1.3 ---- - 0.1 ---- + 0.1
Slovenia - 5.2 - 0.3 + 2.7 + 1.7 - 3.1 - 0.7 + 3.6 + 3.0
Spain ---- + 1.2 ---- - 7.0 ---- - 0.1 ---- - 0.7
Sweden ---- + 2.6 ---- - 2.0 ---- + 4.2 ---- - 1.3
Switzerland ---- + 5.2 ---- - 1.6 ---- + 4.9 ---- + 8.0
United States + 0.7 - 0.1 - 0.8 + 0.2 + 2.6 + 1.8 + 2.0 + 2.3
Another way of looking at change over time is to look at the item on consistency in 
beliefs about God over one’s lifetime. Figure 5 compares those shifting towards faith (“I 
believe in God now, but I didn’t use to.”) with those moving away from belief (“I don’t 
believe in God now, but I used to.”). In 2008 there was a net gain in belief across the life 
course in 10 countries and a decline in 19 countries. The gains averaged 4.0 points and 
the losses -6.8 points for an overall change of -2.8 points.
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Cross-national differences across age groups
Table 2a shows that in 2008 in 29 of 30 countries certain belief in God increased with 
age. The average increase from those 27 and younger to those 68+ was 20.0 points. 
Similarly, Table 2b indicates that in 2008 in 27 of 30 countries never believing in God 
fell with age. The average decrease was 13.7 points. Likewise, agreeing that there is a 
personal God (Table 2c) increased with age in 2008 in 28 of 30 countries by an average 
of 15.8 points. Overall, belief increased with age in 83 of 89 comparisons (93%) and 
averaged +16.5 across the three measures. Only one country, Israel, showed a consistent 
reversed pattern with belief declining with age by an average of -13.1 points. The Philip-
pines, Russia, and Japan each had a single negative association with age, but all three 
countries measured showed increased belief with age.
Table 2a: Differences by age by country in 2008: % certain God exists
0-10       % 20.1-30 % 40.1-50 % 60.1-70 % 80.1-90   %
10.1-20 % 30.1-40 % 50.1-60 % 70.1-80 % 90.1-100 %
 Difference  
Younger 68 68 and older -
Country than 28 28-37 38-47 48-57 58-67 and older younger than 28
Australia 14.7 21.1 27.9 23.0 29.7 36.7 22.0 
Austria 7.7 22.8 16.4 22.2 33.3 31.9 24.2 
Chile 66.1 77.6 80.7 85.7 85.3 92.8 26.7 
Cyprus 47.8 47.8 58.2 69.0 74.3 89.4 41.6 
Czech Republic 6.0 6.5 7.2 11.4 12.7 26.4 20.4 
Denmark 8.1 11.1 10.7 11.5 14.6 22.3 14.2 
France 7.9 12.2 12.4 14.7 19.8 25.7 17.8 
Germany-East 0.0 6.8 6.8 8.9 8.3 12.7 12.7 
Germany-West 17.8 25.2 29.2 27.0 26.2 36.4 18.6 
Great Britain 9.2 19.5 16.7 14.5 17.9 22.3 13.1 
Hungary 15.9 17.2 16.3 22.4 30.7 40.4 24.5 
Ireland 29.5 31.1 42.1 42.7 65.2 70.1 40.6 
Israel 69.1 66.1 66.0 68.0 64.9 52.7 -16.4 
Italy 35.8 29.0 35.7 37.1 42.5 63.5 27.7 
Japan 2.0 2.7 3.2 4.8 4.1 7.8 5.8 
Latvia 11.7 20.7 14.4 23.8 29.4 38.9 27.2 
Netherlands 20.8 16.4 18.2 14.8 23.0 34.3 13.5 
New Zealand 18.8 23.3 27.7 29.9 31.6 30.2 11.4 
Northern Ireland 35.3 33.5 40.2 41.5 57.2 70.6 35.3 
Norway 8.5 12.6 15.9 13.3 21.1 18.3 9.8 
Philippines 76.4 85.8 85.0 85.1 85.2 85.9 9.5 
Poland 48.4 58.4 62.6 66.4 66.3 79.3 30.9 
Portugal 41.4 38.8 41.8 56.9 55.5 75.4 34.0 
Russia 28.2 29.0 31.4 23.8 26.8 41.8 13.6 
Slovakia 34.5 33.8 31.1 37.3 48.9 60.7 26.2 
Slovenia 17.6 22.8 20.9 20.3 23.1 39.1 21.5 
Spain 21.8 28.9 30.0 36.1 48.3 65.4 43.6 
Sweden 8.4 9.3 10.0 11.5 8.2 14.9 6.5 
Switzerland 15.6 23.3 21.1 27.4 19.9 42.2 26.6 
United States 53.8 59.4 55.0 63.8 69.0 66.0 12.2 
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Table 2b: Differences by age by country in 2008: % never believed
0-10      % 20.1-30 % 40.1-50 % 60.1-70 % 80.1-90   %
10.1-20 % 30.1-40 % 50.1-60 % 70.1-80 % 90.1-100 %
Difference  
Younger 68 and younger than 28 -
Country than 28 28-37 38-47 48-57 58-67 older 68 and older 
Australia 26.8 35.4 20.3 19.3 8.8 8.1 18.7 
Chile 4.3 1.7 0.9 0.9 2.1 0.6 3.7 
Cyprus 3.9 3.6 3.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 3.9 
Czech Republic 68.1 60.6 54.4 55.5 40.5 21.2 46.9 
Denmark 29.2 27.9 25.4 24.1 23.9 15.5 13.7 
France 34.6 34.9 25.0 22.3 15.7 12.1 22.5 
Germany-East 71.6 63.6 72.6 62.2 49.0 42.7 28.9 
Germany-West 15.3 15.3 7.5 9.8 4.4 5.8 9.5 
Great Britain 33.0 23.9 25.6 16.1 8.4 11.5 21.5 
Hungary 28.5 31.8 26.7 25.0 15.3 8.3 20.2 
Ireland 4.9 5.5 3.2 2.0 1.6 0.4 4.5 
Israel 8.0 8.2 7.3 5.4 9.5 16.8 -8.8 
Italy 12.0 14.1 4.7 10.6 4.6 0.5 11.5 
Japan 31.4 28.8 35.4 26.3 27.5 17.2 14.2 
Latvia 42.6 24.0 32.1 29.1 23.5 17.6 25.0 
Netherlands 34.2 36.1 29.5 24.9 16.7 11.3 22.9 
New Zealand 28.7 26.2 21.2 19.8 15.4 11.4 17.3 
Northern Ireland 5.8 8.3 3.5 4.5 5.4 0.0 5.8 
Norway 41.1 30.5 26.0 25.1 17.6 9.6 31.5 
Philippines 3.2 1.4 1.2 1.9 3.1 1.3 -1.9 
Poland 3.5 2.4 2.5 1.3 1.0 0.0 3.5 
Portugal 13.1 5.3 5.6 4.4 1.5 2.9 10.2 
Russia 5.9 9.3 12.2 12.0 17.7 14.3 -8.4 
Slovakia 19.0 18.3 19.4 11.3 8.7 3.5 15.5 
Slovenia 27.5 21.7 13.9 18.3 21.0 11.2 16.3 
Spain 17.5 10.2 10.9 5.5 5.0 1.4 16.1 
Sweden 42.1 37.6 38.1 31.3 24.6 17.4 24.7 
Switzerland 21.1 13.8 14.9 10.4 11.0 4.3 16.8 
United States 6.7 5.5 6.8 1.7 2.9 1.2 5.5 
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Table 2c: Differences by age by country in 2008: % agree God personally concerned
0-10       % 20.1-30 % 40.1-50 % 60.1-70 % 80.1-90   %
10.1-20 % 30.1-40 % 50.1-60 % 70.1-80 % 90.1-100 %
Difference 
Younger 68 and  68 and older - 
Country than 28 28-37 38-47 48-57 58-67 older younger than 28 
Australia 22.8 25.8 28.7 28.6 30.7 35.8 13.0 
Austria 23.1 26.1 24.4 30.6 23.8 36.3 13.2 
Chile 59.5 71.0 76.5 72.4 79.6 81.4 21.9 
Cyprus 48.8 48.2 51.9 60.7 70.0 83.0 34.2 
Czech Republic 10.4 11.0 11.2 14.0 17.4 36.6 26.2 
Denmark 22.0 28.2 27.7 27.6 28.1 35.0 13.0 
France 10.9 18.9 17.6 18.8 21.8 24.2 13.3 
Germany-East 6.0 6.8 9.4 11.1 7.3 7.3 1.3 
Germany-West 26.8 31.3 36.3 26.3 30.6 38.2 11.4 
Great Britain 20.9 27.5 28.4 21.5 30.7 32.2 11.3 
Hungary 27.8 28.6 23.5 26.8 30.1 51.7 23.9 
Ireland 49.3 55.4 65.0 65.6 78.7 88.5 39.2 
Israel 70.5 69.4 69.6 66.5 58.8 56.5 -14.0 
Italy 50.7 38.0 56.3 42.4 62.1 72.4 21.7 
Japan 25.5 26.1 21.7 25.3 22.5 23.8 -1.7 
Latvia 26.5 35.2 29.9 37.0 48.4 63.4 36.9 
Netherlands 25.0 20.2 22.0 18.1 25.1 36.4 11.4 
New Zealand 27.1 35.6 35.5 35.1 36.5 35.3 8.2 
Northern Ireland 51.3 46.1 58.3 56.4 69.2 79.0 27.7 
Norway 18.4 25.8 21.6 26.5 32.2 29.8 11.4 
Philippines 90.4 92.6 92.1 93.8 89.1 92.3 1.9 
Poland 51.6 57.8 64.1 57.1 59.7 75.7 24.1 
Portugal 46.7 45.5 58.2 52.6 73.0 77.8 31.1 
Russia 39.1 37.7 45.7 35.2 42.7 48.1 9.0 
Slovakia 45.5 47.4 44.4 48.8 58.0 71.9 26.4 
Slovenia 21.8 27.7 23.5 27.9 29.4 32.9 11.1 
Spain 29.4 31.8 29.8 36.5 47.0 61.2 31.8 
Sweden 18.5 16.5 18.6 22.0 16.4 23.6 5.1 
Switzerland 42.7 44.3 49.7 47.1 36.5 46.5 3.8 
United States 65.6 64.6 66.4 75.2 74.3 72.5 6.9 
 
Looking at the differences across adjoining age groups shows that the largest increases 
were most often between the 58-67 year olds and those 68+ (Having biggest difference: 
younger than 28 to 28-37 18.5%; 28-37 to 38-47 9.0%; 38-47 to 58-67 20.2%, and 
57-68 to 68+ 42.7%). This suggests that belief in God is especially likely to increase 
among the oldest groups, perhaps in response to the increasing anticipation of mortality 
occurring.
A comparison was also carried out of changes across time with cohort. It showed lit-
tle clear indication overall of either aging or cohort effects. Across the five cohorts that 
could be tracked from 1998 to 2008 certain belief in God decreased in 64 instances and 
increased in 86 cases. Decreases and increases were exactly balanced (50% each) for the 
three cohorts under age 48 in 1998. Increases then grew to 63% for the 48-57 cohort in 
1998, to 73% for the 58-67 cohort in 1998. This interaction further supports the idea that 
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there is an aging effect in which belief increases as the anticipation of mortality rises. 
But there is also some evidence of a cohort effect. Comparison of the entering cohorts 
(younger than 28) in 1998 and 2008 indicates lower belief in 2008 than in 1998 in 77% 
of the countries; an average decline of 2.5 points. This suggests that new cohorts are 
starting adulthood with lower belief than earlier entering cohorts, perhaps due to grow-
ing secularization over time.
It is noteworthy that of the only three countries that had increases in overall belief on 
all three measures (Israel, Russia, and Slovenia), they were also the only countries that 
had increases in belief across all cohorts.
Conclusion
Belief in God has decreased in most countries, but the declines are quite modest espe-
cially when calculated on a per annum basis. It is only the repetition of the modest 
declines across measures and countries that makes the case for a general diminution in 
belief in God. This is further illustrated by the situation in the United States. Belief in 
God remains high, but has slowly eroded from the 1950s to the present (Chaves, 2011; 
Smith, 2009 & 2012). If the modest, general trend away from belief in God continues 
uninterrupted, it will accumulate to larger proportions and the atheism that is now 
prominent mainly in northwest Europe and some ex-Socialist states may spread more 
widely. But it is also possible that the pro-belief “exceptions” (Russia, Slovenia, and 
Israel) may become more widespread and belief may make more of a general rebound 
perhaps in response to a growth in “existential insecurity,” from a nationalistic, in-group 
growth in religious identity (e.g. Arab, Islamic movements, Hindu nationalism, etc.), or 
from some other societal impetus. 
While the age-group differences suggest the possibility of changes across cohorts 
that represent larger, more widespread, and longer-term declines in belief in God, these 
figures confound cohort and aging effects and the analysis suggests that a substantial 
component of the age-group differences results from aging effects rather than from 
changes across cohorts. This is supported by earlier analysis of church attendance and 
religious identification that indicates aging/life-cycle effects (Smith, 2009).
While there is a modest, general shift away from belief in God, there is enormous vari-
ation across countries in the level of believers, atheists, and intermediate groups. Certi-
tude that God exists ranges from 84% in the Philippines to 4% in Japan and conversely 
atheism rises from less than 1% in the Philippines to 52% in East Germany. Similarly, 
strong believers run from 60% in the Philippines down to 2.5% in East Germany, while 
strong atheists rise from nearly zero in the Philippines to 46% in East Germany. Even 
within the former Socialist states, the range is enormous with East Germany of course 
anchoring the secular pole and Poland near the top for believers.
Thus, while there is a drift towards lesser belief in God consistent with secularization 
theory the changes are modest in magnitude and mixed in scope. Countries have shown 
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and are likely to continue to show huge differences in levels and trends about belief in 
God and a homogenization of belief (or disbelief) is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable 
future.
Data
ISSP Research Group (2011): International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III - 
ISSP 1991-1998-2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5070 Data file Version 1.0.0, 
doi:10.4232/1.10860.
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Appendix: Question wordings
A.  Please indicate which statement below comes closest to expressing what you believe 
about God.
I don’t believe in God.
I don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to find out.
I don’t believe in a personal God, but do believe in a Higher Power of some kind.
I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others.
While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.
I know that God really exists and I have no doubts about it.
Can’t Choose
No Answer
B.  Which best describes your beliefs about God?
I don’t believe in God now, and I never have.
I don’t believe in God now, but I used to.
I believe in God now, but I didn’t used to.
I believe in God now and I always have.
Can’t Choose
No Answer
C. Do you agree or disagree with the following…
There is a God who concerns himself with every human being personally.
Strongly Agree/Agree/Neither Agree nor Disagree/Disagree/Strongly Agree/Can’t 
Choose/No Answer
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Understanding Variation in Religious Beliefs 1991-2008
The Impact of Modernization and Social Inequality1
Jonas Edlund
Introduction
In a historical perspective, few would deny that religion, in its various forms and 
structures, has had a major impact on contemporary societies. Even in Europe, where 
organized religion has gradually lost power over the last centuries, we can still observe 
religious influences institutionalized in contemporary societies’ systems of law, social 
policy, and political party structures.
Focusing primarily on the declining impact of organized religion in Europe, some 
scholars predicted that religion would be an increasingly marginalized phenomenon 
which would gradually lose its societal impact. This idea, known as the secularization 
thesis – a theoretical approach that dominated the field up to the 1980s, whose ideas also 
influenced mass opinion – forms the backdrop of this chapter.
Religion and secularization are multifaceted concepts which can be approached from 
a variety of angles.2 In this chapter, the focus is exclusively on religious faith among 
ordinary citizens, not on religious practices or organizational aspects of religion. By 
using trend data covering twenty-nine countries, we will first look at country specific 
patterns of religious faith over time. Here, we will be able to answer whether a general, 
more or less linear trend of secularization can be detected. Thereafter, we will examine 
a related issue: the extent to which cross-national variation in religious faith can be 
1 I wish to thank Insa Bechert, Arvid Bäckström, Ingemar Johansson-Sevä, Annette Schnabel, 
Rune Åberg and Ida Öun for giving valuable comments on a previous version of the paper. 
The research was financed by the Umeå University‘s Young Researcher Award research grant. I 
would like to give special thanks to Rune Åberg. In 1993, Sweden attended the annual meeting 
of the International Social Survey Programme for the first time. This year it was organized 
by the American colleagues at NORC, University of Chicago. On the flight to Chicago, Rune 
and I were reading a paper based on the first ISSP survey on religion. Rune carefully studied 
the tables and discussed possible causal explanations underlying the substantial variation in 
religiosity across countries. His theoretical insights and thoughts made a lasting impression 
on me and provided great inspiration when writing this chapter nearly twenty years later. 
2 I am aware of the various meanings that have been attached to the concept of secularization 
and the associated critique (Shiner, 1967; Dobbelaere, 1981; Johnstone, 2007). However, the 
concept is difficult to avoid, as it has been rather popular, having been used by both rank-
and-file citizens as well as scholars. In its most general meaning, secularization essentially 
means that “religion is less important now than it was in the past” (Johnstone, 2007: 408). 
For a clarification of the concept of religion and the critical differences between religion and 
magic, see Johnstone (2007).
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explained by the level of modernization/industrialization. Finally, we will test an alter-
native explanatory approach, emphasizing that cross-country variation in religiousness 
may have more to do with the level of social distress/inequality in a country than with 
its level of modernization. Both theoretical approaches are described below.
Modernization theory
The idea that religion has gradually lost its legitimacy and status in Western societies 
is known as the secularization thesis and has been quite popular both among social 
scientists and the general public (Berger, 1967; Wilson, 1982; Bruce, 1992). Formulated 
during the Enlightenment and subsequently refined and developed within classical soci-
ology, the theory suggests that there is a fundamental conflict between modern society 
and religion. Greeley (2003: ix), highly critical of the whole approach, writes: “Most 
sociologists of religion (…) describe a general decline in religious faith and practice in 
Europe. The destruction of the “sacred canopy” by religious pluralism, the Enlighten-
ment, the French Revolution, the discoveries of science, the rise of socialism, urbaniza-
tion, industrialization, modernization, the influence of Marx and Freud, the increase in 
educational attainment – all have tended to diminish the power of the churches and to 
demystify the human condition.” 
In Greeley’s view, scholars have focused their intentions with single-minded enthusi-
asm on the decline of religion, and have paid little attention to alternative developments 
of religion, such as empirically documented cases of increased sacralisation, or religious 
transformation from traditional forms of religious beliefs into more privatized, individu-
ally constructed belief systems (Greeley, 2003; Greeley, 2007; Davie, 1990; Inglehart, 
1997; Berger, 1999; Finke and Stark, 1988). Greeley (2003: ix) criticizes secularization 
theory for being too deterministic, and its proponents for being insensitive to alterna-
tive explanations. Somewhat sarcastically he portrays the main idea of the tradition as: 
“Religion must decline, you see, because it ought to decline. Secularization has become 
a dogma.” 
While the type of secularization/modernization theory that Greeley (2007: 158) criti-
cizes as “a one-dimensional, unidirectional model of inevitable change” does predict a 
general decline of religion as time passes, it is possible to formulate a somewhat more 
specific variant: that the level of religiosity tends to be lower in highly modernized com-
pared to less modernized countries. In this chapter we will examine these two theses of 
secularization; the first by examining trends within countries and the second by examin-
ing the relationship between modernization (as measured by the level of industrializa-
tion) and religiousness on the country level.
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The social distress/inequality approach
Rather than focusing on the overall level of socio-economic development, the second 
approach puts more emphasis on the internal distribution of risks and resources within a 
society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Marmot, 2004). As argued by Wilkinson and Pick-
ett (2010: 25): “The problems in rich countries are not caused by the society not being 
rich enough (or even by being too rich) but by the scale of material differences between 
people within each society being too big. What matters is where we stand in relation to 
others in our own society.” Great inequalities in resources and risks between different 
social strata in the population are assumed to increase social stress, anxiety, and lack of 
social trust, not only among those worst-off, but in the population at large.
Although this approach has focused primarily on health issues, the argument can be 
applied to the subject in this chapter also. A specific and significant aspect of religion 
that sets it apart from most other belief-systems is the emphasis on providing comfort, 
meaning, and guidelines during hard times of life. This aspect is assumed to be of utmost 
importance for explaining why people are attracted to religion (Goodenough, 1965; 
Spinks, 1963; Yinger, 1970). In societies characterized by high levels of social inequality 
the need for comfort, guidance, and explanation during life’s hard times – needs that 
are met by religion – is supposed to be stronger compared to societies with low levels of 
social inequality.
Theoretical approaches in other social science fields which predict a similar outcome 
are easily found, in fact, Höllinger and Haller (2009), Norris and Inglehart (2004), as 
well as Inglehart (1997) all offer a similar argument as that raised in this chapter, how-
ever with a focus more on the risk-reducing components of an ambitious welfare state. 
Among scholars dealing with social cohesion, believed to be an important prerequisite 
for a well-functioning and healthy society, we find works claiming both religion and 
social policy as important for societal social cohesion (Schnabel and Grötsch, 2012; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2007). However, considering the societies and historical period covered by 
the references, the core of the argument seems to suggest that in unequal and insecure 
societies – having no or only a small welfare state, religion provides social cohesion. In 
ambitious welfare states, where risks and resources are equalized to a large extent, social 
policy has overtaken the role of providing social cohesion. 
The summarized general idea is thus that cross-national differences in religiosity may 
be explained by the level of social inequality. In countries where material resources and 
risks are highly unequally distributed, the general level of religiosity should be higher 
compared to societies characterized by social and economic equality.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: First, the variables and data are 
described. This is followed by an analysis of country-internal trends of religious faith. 
Next comes the country level part which analyzes the extent to which cross-national dif-
ferences in religiosity are associated with levels of modernization and social inequality. 
A concluding section closes out the chapter. 
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Variables, data, and the religious beliefs model characteristics
Beginning with the country level data, two indicators of modernization – both measur-
ing the wealth of a country – are applied: [A] the GNI/capita and [B] the PPP GNI/capita 
(both in US$). The GNI/capita is developed by the World Bank and is a refined measure 
of the well-known GDP/capita measure. The PPP (Purchasing Power Parities) variant is 
adjusted for national differences in purchasing power.3 
The indicators measuring the degree of social distress/inequality in a country are 
as follows: [C] the income distribution in the country, measured with the Gini coeffi-
cient, which can vary between 0 (maximum income equality, all citizens have the same 
income) and 1 (maximum income inequality, one citizen receives all income); and [D] the 
overall tax revenue as percentage of GDP. The latter measure is an indicator of welfare 
state ambition, and correlates very strongly with other relevant indicators of welfare 
state size and effort, such as social spending levels and redistributive capacity (Edlund, 
2007). Regarding the quality of these indicators, it bears mentioning that various sources 
have been employed to find data on income distribution, and the same definition of 
income was not always used. The tax/GDP indicator, in contrast, seems to be a more 
harmonized and standardized measure.4 
It should be stressed that the two types of macro-economic indicators – wealth and 
inequality – are relatively independent of each other. Among the relatively equal coun-
tries we find both wealthy and less wealthy countries, and the same is true for the group 
of highly unequal countries.5
The survey data comes from the cumulative weighted ISSP file on religion fielded 
in 1991, 1998, and 2008. Only countries that fielded at least two of these surveys are 
included in the data set. The guiding idea when selecting indicators of religiosity is 
that they should not refer specifically to organized forms of religion, such as church 
attendance or church affiliation, as it is important not to exclude those having more 
individualistic and privatized religious beliefs – those “believing without belonging” 
(Davie, 1990). In a similar vein, items that are only relevant for certain religious groups 
have also been avoided. The three chosen indicators are: Do you believe in… 1. Life after 
Death; 2. Heaven; 3. Hell. Answer categories: Yes, definitely; Yes, probably; No, probably 
not; No, definitely not.  
3 In theory, the driving force behind modernization is industrialization which is defined as the 
increasing and widespread use of: (a) tools that multiply the effects of their initial applications 
of energy and, (b) inanimate sources of energy (Wilensky, 2002: 3). Against this backdrop, 
the chosen indicators are not ideal. However, the wealth of a country correlates strongly with 
other technical indicators of industrialization (Marsh 2007), and it has been used in previous 
research (Wilensky, 2002). Moreover, the measures are available for all countries and for all 
years.
4 The Gini coefficient has been collected from the following sources: The World Bank database; 
The World Factbook (CIA); The Quality of Government database. Data on taxes come mainly 
from the OECD database. For some countries data were obtained from the following: Eurostat; 
The Heritage Foundation; IMF. 
5 Although a correlation matrix shows positive relationships between wealth and inequality, the 
magnitude of these coefficients is rather small (see Appendix, Table A1).  
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Although the large majority of the countries in the data set are Christian, it may be 
noted that the three concepts – Life after Death, Heaven, and Hell – are important in all 
of the major religions. Before analysing country trends in religiosity, we will first study 
how these three indicators are associated with one another. Is it simply a difference 
between believers (responding “yes” on all three items) and non-believers (responding 
“no” on all three items) or are there other common combinations of religious faith among 
citizens? While those believing in all three phenomena may be regarded as believers in 
the traditional sense of religion, those believing in none of them can be understood as 
non-believers or non-religious. The extent to which people tend to believe in only one 
or two of these phenomena may be understood as expressions of religious beliefs that 
deviate more or less from the traditional understanding of religiosity.
The statistical tool known as Latent Class Analysis enables cross-national delineation 
of the most dominant forms of religious faith present among citizens. An analysis of 
the data reveals that there are four common types of religiosity. Grouping respondents 
according to their religious faith reveals four clusters of respondents.6 The type of reli-
gious faith that distinguishes each cluster is indicated by the response probabilities on 
each indicator by cluster membership. These are shown in Figure 1. 
6 After running a series of Latent Class Models (LCA), it was apparent that the data was more 
complex than a simple dichotomy between believers and non-believers. In fact, a 4-cluster 
model provided the best fit to the data structure. In the analysis, the three items were dichoto-
mized (1=yes, definitely/yes, probably; 0=no probably not/no, definitely not). Furthermore, 
in the LCA model, “country” and “year” were entered as covariates, which means that the 
response probabilities by cluster membership reported in Table 1 are identical across countries 
and over time. Religious change is therefore indicated by a change in the size of a cluster. In 
other words, while the quality of each cluster, respectively, is the same across time and space, 
the size of each cluster is allowed to vary across time and space. Individual level covariates 
included in the model: age, sex, and education. Model fit statistics of the 4-cluster model: 
L2 = 17041.87; df = 12190. Reduction of L2 compared to the 1-cluster baseline model = 87.4 
percent.
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Figure 1: Item response probabilities by cluster membership (in %, n= 79615)
Cluster 1 in Figure 1 shows us a group of citizens who can be labelled “non-believers.” 
These respondents show a very low probability for believing in Life after Death (1.5 
percent), Heaven (2.1 percent), and Hell (0.8 percent). Cluster 2 represents those only 
believing in Life after Death who deny the existence of both Heaven and Hell. Cluster 
3 includes those who believe in Life after Death and Heaven, but not in Hell. Together, 
these clusters can be described as being “alternative believers”. Cluster 4 groups together 
those strongly believing in all three phenomena; hereafter labelled “traditional believ-
ers”.
On average across all twenty-nine countries, the share of non-believers (39.0 percent) 
is about the same as the share of traditional believers (36.9 percent). The shares of alter-
native believers are substantially smaller, 11.2 percent (Alternative believers I) and 12.9 
percent (Alternative believers II). In the next section we will study trends and country 
differences in religiosity by analysing how these cluster sizes vary across countries and 
over time.
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Trends in religious beliefs in twenty-nine countries7
In an attempt to summarize the different, observable trends of religiosity, the countries 
that share common paths have been grouped together. For fourteen countries, roughly 
following three different paths, it is difficult to find any signs of declining religious faith. 
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Figure 2: Countries experiencing decreasing shares of non-believers (religious beliefs in %)
The first path, as depicted in Figure 2, illustrates an evident decline over time of non-
believers, in tandem with an increase of traditional believers among five of six coun-
tries. This pattern is particularly significant in Israel – where the share of non-believers 
decreased from 55 percent to 35 percent between 1991 and 2008, and the proportion of 
7 West and East Germany are treated as seperate countries.
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traditional believers increased from 38 percent in 1991 to 58 percent in 2008 – but it is 
also a pronounced pattern in Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary.8 The Netherlands deviates 
somewhat, as the increased level of religiosity is primarily among those having alterna-
tive beliefs.
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Figure 3: Countries experiencing increasing shares of traditional believers (religious beliefs in %)
Figure 3 portrays four countries where traditional religious beliefs grow stronger over 
time. However, this trend is not accompanied by a systematic decline of non-believers. 
Rather, it seems that the share of traditional believers has expanded at the expense of 
those holding alternative beliefs. Italy is a telling example, where the share of traditional 
believers (Cluster 4) increased from 47 percent in 1991 to 59 percent in 2008, while the 
proportion of alternative believers (Clusters 2 and 3) decreased from 24 percent to 12 
percent between 1991 and 2008.
8 Data on Israel does not include the Arab sector. 
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Figure 4: Strongly religious and overtime stable countries (religious beliefs in %)
Figure 4 presents four countries as primarily distinguished by their strong religious 
beliefs. In the Philippines and the USA, traditional believers form an overwhelming 
majority; about 75 percent of the respondents on average. In Chile and Ireland, tradi-
tional believers constitute about half of the citizenry. The share of non-believers is rather 
small in all of these four countries, ranging from 14 percent in Ireland down to less than 
5 percent in the Philippines.
Figures 2-4 detail the results for fourteen countries where the main conclusion to 
be drawn is that it is hard to find signs suggesting religious decline. Moving on to the 
remaining fifteen countries, the data suggests that five of them, depicted in Figure 5, 
may perhaps best be described as experiencing some stability in religious faith over time, 
although the mean level differs considerably across the various countries. Also worth 
noting is that the large differences in religious faith between the Western and Eastern 
parts of Germany show no sign of convergence over time.
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Figure 5: Countries experiencing overtime stability in religiousity (religious beliefs in %)
Figure 6 shows the ten countries that more or less fit the predictions of the secularization 
thesis; in these countries, the share of non-believers has generally increased over time. 
In Cyprus, Norway, France, Spain, and Portugal, in particular, the decline is most pro-
nounced among those holding traditional religious beliefs. In Sweden and Great Britain, 
the observed decline between 1998 and 2008 relates primarily to alternative believers; in 
Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Denmark, the decline in religiosity seems to appear 
both among those having traditional and alternative beliefs. It may be noted that the 
decline of religious faith appears exclusively in Europe. Out of the twenty-one European 
countries covered in this chapter, the secularization thesis is valid in about half of them. 
It is also worth noting that the Netherlands is absent from among these countries, as this 
is a country regularly cited as fitting the secularization thesis (see Greeley, 2003; Greeley, 
2007 and references cited therein).
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So far, the focus has been on trends in religious faith within countries, and the main 
conclusion is that no general systematic pattern of secularization can be found. How-
ever, by mainly focusing on trends within countries, proper attention has not been given 
to the variation in religious faith that exists in contemporary societies; a cross-country 
variation that, with a few exceptions, seems rather persistent over time.
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Figure 7 illustrates the proportion of non-believers in 2008 across all twenty-nine coun-
tries. In nine countries, non-believers constitute the majority. Nevertheless, the share 
of non-believers comprises 60 percent or more of the population in only four coun-
tries: Germany-East, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Denmark. In nineteen countries, 
non-believers are in the minority, and in thirteen of these countries, the share of non-
believers is 40 percent or less. In the Philippines, Chile, USA, Ireland, and Poland, the 
share of non-believers is especially small, ranging from 22 percent in Poland down to 3 
percent in the Philippines. While the least religious countries are situated within Europe, 
the most religious countries are scattered across several continents: Asia, Latin America, 
North America, and Europe. 
Cross-national variation in religious faith – the impact of 
modernization and social distress/inequality
The next step is to test the extent to which modernization theory and social distress/
inequality theory may explain cross-national variation in religious faith. The first objec-
tive is to examine whether the level of religious faith tends to be lower in relatively rich 
societies compared to relatively poor societies, as predicted by modernization theory. The 
unit of analysis is “country-year” (n=71).9
Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients.10 The coefficient can vary between 1 
and -1, where 0 indicates no relationship between the variables and 1 (-1) indicates a 
perfect linear positive (negative) relationship. A strong and significant positive correla-
tion between the share of non-believers (Cluster 1) and the wealth indicators [A] and [B] 
would provide empirical support for the modernization thesis. However, the correlation 
coefficients are quite weak (.14 and .15) and non-significant, indicating that the level of 
modernization in a country does not tell us much about the prevalence of non-believers 
in the citizenry.
9 In this analysis, Germany-East and Germany-West have been collapsed into a single category 
using a population weight.
10 Analyses of the correlations per year (1991: n=16; 1998: n=27; 2008: n=28) show similar 
results to those reported in Table 1. In other words, although the countries included dif-
fer across survey-waves, the correlation coefficients are remarkably stable across the waves, 
although a greater variation seems to pertain to the weaker correlations. For example, while 
the correlations between [A] and cluster 1 vary between -.08 and .20, the correlations between 
[D] and cluster 1 vary between .63 and .69. The table is available on request.
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Table 1: Associations between religious beliefs and country-level indicators of modernization 
[A] [B] and social inequality [C] [D]. Pearson’s r (n=71)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Non-believers
Alternative 
believers I
Alternative 
believers II
Traditional 
believers
[A] GNI/capita .14 .39*** .20 -.35** a
[B] PPP GNI/capita .15 .34** .09 -.30*
[C] Gini b .63*** .55*** -.25* -.64***
[D] Tax/GDP .65*** .53*** -.23 -.66***
[A+C] .60***
[A+D] .57***
[C+D] .70*** .59*** -.26* -.70***
a Significance levels: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05
b The Gini coefficient is reversed 
The small impact of modernization is further illustrated in Table 2, where the average 
share of non-believers is shown for two groups: Q1 – the poorest quintile of the “coun-
try-year” cases (n=14), and Q5 – the richest quintile of the “country-year” cases (n=14). 
Here, Table 2 reveals that Q1 has an average GNI/capita equivalent to US$ 3 446, and the 
average share of non-believers is 37 percent. Q5, having an average GNI/capita of US$ 
49 847, has an average share of non-believers constituting 41 percent of the respond-
ents; a difference of only 4 percentage units. 
Table 2: Religious beliefs by GNI/capita [A]. Quintiles 1 & 5. Percent
GNI/capita [A] Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Non-believers
Alternative 
believers I
Alternative 
believers II
Traditional 
believers
Q 1 3 446 37 8 10 45
Q 5 49 847 41 15 16 28
Quintiles ordered by [A] (GNI/capita)
Moving on to the second approach – regarding the role of social inequality for the preva-
lence of religious beliefs – we return to Table 1. As indicated by the correlation coeffi-
cients for Gini [C] and tax/GDP [D], strong positive relationships exist between the share 
of non-believers and the level of inequality (.63 and .65). Note that the Gini coefficient 
is reversed, the higher the value, the more equal the income distribution. In more equal 
welfare state societies the prevalence of non-believers is more common compared to 
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societies characterized by social inequality.11 This is further illustrated in Table 3. Quintile 
1 contains the fourteen most unequal “country-year” samples, having an average Gini 
coefficient of 42.8 and an average tax rate corresponding to 25.9 percent of GDP. The 
corresponding figures for quintile 5 (the fourteen most equal “country-year” samples) are 
25.7 (Gini) and 44.1 (tax/GDP). The share of non-believers differs substantially between 
Q1 and Q5, 21 percent and 51 percent, respectively.
Table 3: Religious beliefs by Gini [C] and tax/GDP [D]. Quintiles 1 & 5. Percent
Gini [C] Tax/GDP [D] Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Non-believers
Alternative 
believers I
Alternative 
believers II
Traditional 
believers
Q 1 42.8 25.9 21 7 14 58
Q 5 25.7 44.1 51 18 12 19
Quintiles ordered by [C+D] (composite standardized measure of the Gini and tax/GDP indicators)
Let us again return to Table 1 and examine the correlations between the macro-level 
indicators and the three types of religious beliefs. With respect to Cluster 4, we find 
that the share of traditional believers is much larger in unequal societies compared to 
relatively equal societies. A similar tendency, but substantially weaker, can be observed 
with respect to the modernization indicators. The different magnitude of the effects 
can clearly be seen by comparing the share of traditional believers in the Q1 and Q5 
“country-year” groupings in Tables 2 and 3. As shown in Table 2, the share of traditional 
believers varies between 45 percent (Q1) and 28 percent (Q5), indicating a difference of 
17 percentage units between the poorest and the richest quintiles. In Table 3, the share of 
traditional believers is 58 percent and 19 percent, for Q1 and Q5, respectively, indicating 
a difference of 39 percentage units. The results suggest that country differences in the 
prevalence of non-religious citizens as well as traditional religious citizens have more to 
do with the level of social inequality than with the level of modernization.
A final noteworthy point is the association between the share of people holding alter-
native religious beliefs (believing in Life after Death only, Cluster 2) and the two sets of 
macro-level indicators. As shown by the correlation coefficients in Table 1, the share 
of alternative believers tends to be larger in more equal and rich societies, compared to 
more unequal and poor societies. Again, however, we find that correlations are stronger 
for the social inequality indicators than for the wealth-based measures.
11 In addition, a number of composite standardized measures based on indicators [A, B, C, D] 
were constructed and tested. Most of these failed to improve correlations except for those 
reported in Table 1. Of special interest is the composite measure of indicators [C+D] which 
tends to improve the correlation coefficients across all four clusters. The [A+C] and [A+D] 
composite measures improved the correlation coefficients for cluster 2.
44 GESIS Series  |  Volume 13
Edlund: Understanding Variation in Religious Beliefs 1991-2008
Conclusions
Among the twenty-nine countries studied in this chapter, trends fitting the seculariza-
tion thesis can be observed in ten countries, all located in Europe. No sign of declining 
religious faith can be detected in nineteen countries. In some of these countries rising 
levels in religious faith can be observed, while in other countries, the data suggests sta-
bility in religious faith over time. However, the level of religiousness across such “faith 
stable” countries differs considerably. Some are strongly religious: the Philippines, Chile, 
USA, and Ireland. In stark contrast, there is Germany-East, distinguished by its excep-
tionally large and persistent share of non-believers. The Czech Republic, Denmark, and 
Hungary are the other relatively secular countries. 
When explaining national differences in religiosity, the effects of modernization are 
of limited significance. While it is true that the share of traditional believers tends to be 
smaller in more modernized than in less modernized societies, the prevalence of non-
believers seems unrelated to the level of modernization. In contrast to the overall weak 
empirical evidence in favour of the modernization thesis, the social distress/ inequal-
ity thesis receives substantial empirical support.12 Traditional religious beliefs are more 
common in societies characterized by high levels of social inequality compared to socie-
ties where risks and resources are distributed more equally among citizens. A similarly 
strong, but reverse pattern is true with respect to the prevalence of non-religious citizens. 
It should, however, be recognized that in relatively rich and equal societies, the decline 
of traditional religious beliefs is to some extent compensated by an increase in alterna-
tive religious beliefs. Modernization, as well as the equalization of risks and resources in 
a society, does not necessarily mean the disappearance of religion, but rather a change 
in its form, practice, and content.
Data
ISSP Research Group (2011): International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III - 
ISSP 1991-1998-2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5070 Data file Version 1.0.0, 
doi:10.4232/1.10860.
12 It is not common in the literature to test the impact of factors related to social inequality. 
I have found three cross-national comparative works, two using ISSP data from the 1990s 
(Smith, 2009; Höllinger and Haller, 2009) and one using the World Values Survey data base 
1981-2002 (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). All of them apply different indicators of religiosity 
compared to those used in this chapter. All three report significant and strong relationships 
between the level of religiosity and the level of social inequality. The similarity of the find-
ings despite using different indicators of religiosity, as well as different data, may indicate the 
robustness of the finding. 
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Appendix
Table A1:  Associations between country-level indicators of modernization [A] [B] and social 
inequality [C] [D]. Pearson’s r (n=71)
[A] [B] [C]
[A] GNI/capita
[B] PPP GNI/capita .96*** a
[C] Gini b .26* .24*
[D] Tax/GDP .29* .28* .69***
a Significance levels: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05
b The Gini coefficient is reversed 
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Trends in Church Attendance Among Christian Societies 
in the Second Half of the 20th Century
Franz Höllinger
Introduction
Social scientists have given, and continue to give highly different evaluations and pre-
dictions concerning the role of religion in modern societies. The classical thesis of secu-
larization – as formulated for example in Auguste Comte´s ‘law of three stages’ or in Max 
Weber´s ‘thesis of the disenchantment of the world’ – assumes that religion will become 
less important the more societies are able to control and to improve the living-conditions 
of their members through scientific knowledge. According to this thesis, higher levels of 
technological and socio-economic development should go hand in hand with a decline 
of religion. A second line of argumentation, the thesis of the privatization of religion, 
holds that living-conditions in modern societies do not entail a general decline in religi-
osity, but a shift from universal religious institutions to religious pluralism, and to more 
private and “invisible” forms of religion (Luckmann, 1967). Exponents of the market-
model of religion expect that in modern, pluralist religious societies the level of religious 
activities will be even higher than in traditional societies, because competition among 
the suppliers of religious goods forces them to make their products more attractive (Finke 
and Stark, 1998). While these approaches refer to universal tendencies of religious devel-
opment in modern societies, some sociologists of religion emphasize that the role of reli-
gion in a given society is influenced by a complex set of social and cultural factors; and 
thus, in highly developed modern societies the importance of specific forms of religion 
may therefore vary significantly between countries and culture-areas (e.g. Martin, 1978; 
Casanova, 1994; Höllinger, 1996; Höllinger and Haller, 2009). Notably, it has been sug-
gested that the religious developments in Europe may not be the model that other parts 
of the world would follow in the course of their socioeconomic development, but that the 
strong decline of religious beliefs and practices in Europe might rather be an exception 
to the international trends (Davie, 1999).
This contribution focuses on a specific aspect of religious development: changes in 
church attendance. To help reduce the complexity of the subject, only Christian countries 
will be considered. Although sociologists of religion have rightly pointed out that the 
frequency of a person’s church attendance is not necessarily an indicator of the intensity 
of his/her religiosity, empirical studies demonstrate that in the subjective evaluation of 
the majority of the people in modern societies these two dimensions are closely con-
nected: persons who attend church regularly usually consider themselves as religious, 
and vice versa; the less frequently somebody goes to church the more likely he/she will 
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consider him/herself a non-religious person. (The close association between church-
attendance and religiosity in common-sense perception is also reflected by the fact that 
people who practice alternative forms of spirituality, such as yoga or meditation, prefer-
entially consider themselves as spiritual, but not as religious persons; see Höllinger and 
Tripold, 2012). The level of church attendance does seem to be a good indicator for the 
importance of communitarian religion in different societies. The following presents find-
ings from 34 Christian countries which have participated in ISSP- 2008 “Religion,” and 
interprets the results against the background of the theoretical approaches mentioned 
above.1
Denominational structure clearly represents an important factor for explaining coun-
try differences with regard to church attendance. During the last decades, church mem-
bership has dropped drastically in some Western countries. Thus, to determine the impact 
of denominational structure on the intensity of religious community life, it is better 
to refer to the denomination of the respondent´s parents. More useful would be to go 
further back into the past, when almost the entire population maintained a church affili-
ation. Table 1 presents an overview of the denominations of respondents’ mothers for 
the countries in comparison. The spectrum of denominations divides into four groups: 
(a) Catholic; (b) Orthodox; (c) Protestant State Church i.e. a church which has/has had 
historically a politically privileged position and/or which was the numerically dominant 
church in a given country or in certain political subunits of this country, as was the case 
for example in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and Latvia; and (d) other Christian 
denominations, i.e. churches which are usually rather small in terms of the number of 
members and which approximate sect-types of religions such as Methodists, Baptists, 
Mormons, etc.
Table 1: Denominational structure and regular church attendance in the countries
Country
Country 
Code for 
Figure 1
Denomination Church attendance 
2-3 times. p. monthMother of respondent
Respon-
dent: 
none
Catholic Ortho-dox
Protest 
State 
Church
other 
Christ. 
Denom
none
Parents 
of resp. 
60y +
Respon- 
dent 
18-39y
Sweden SWE 3 2 83 2 5 30 14 2
Denmark DK 2 84 9 16 14 3
Finland FI 2 92 2 3 17 10 4
Norway NO 1 85 6 6 16 15 6
Russia RU 1 73 21 16 12 4
E-Germany E-G 8 49 5 36 73 27 2
France FR 87 3 8 45 33 4
Hungary HU 68 25 7 16 44 5
Czech Rep. CZ 58 10 32 60 40 6
Latvia LV 26 24 26 3 21 39 31 7
1 The statistical analyses were carried out with the unweighted country datasets.
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Country
Country 
Code for 
Figure 1
Denomination Church attendance 
2-3 times. p. monthMother of respondent
Respon-
dent: 
none
Catholic Ortho-dox
Protest 
State 
Church
other 
Christ. 
Denom
none
Parents 
of resp. 
60y +
Respon- 
dent 
18-39y
Australia AUS 28 2 40 17 9 37 30 9
Uruguay URU 72 12 15 22 23 10
Ukraine UKR 8 77 1 14 8 22 12
Great Britain GB 14 51 19 11 40 28 13
New Zealand NZ 20 2 40 20 17 33 34 13
Flanders FLA 91 1 7 22 71 3
Netherlands NL 44 33 6 14 41 64 10
Austria A 85 8 4 17 59 10
Switzerland CH 47 1 42 4 2 25 52 13
Cyprus CY 1 98 0 68 13
Spain ES 93 1 1 3 21 61 15
W-Germany W-G 44 41 5 6 16 51 16
Slovenia SLO 87 3 2 6 20 64 16
Portugal PT 96 1 2 1 8 71 20
Chile CHL 81 17 1 7 53 24
Croatia HR 91 4 0 3 6 59 27
Italy ITA 96 1 3 10 67 30
USA USA 29 1 61 5 10 58 30
Slovakia SK 79 1 14 6 17 72 32
N-Ireland NIRL 40 47 12 1 11 69 37
South Africa ZA 14 66 9 12 74 46
Mexico MEX 88 1 7 3 8 73 54
Dominican R. DOM 83 12 5 3 64 56
Philippines PHIL 86 8 0 69 71
Ireland IRL 93 1 1 7 96 38
Poland PL 98 1 1 12 90 45
Note: Numbers of less than one percent as well as the percentage of nonresponse to the question 
of the denomination of respondent’s mother were omitted from the table.
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The development of church attendance from the middle of the 
20th century to the present
Two methods are generally employed to measure changes in church attendance over 
time. The first compares the results of different survey waves. The relevant cross-national 
comparative surveys (European Values Survey, World Values Survey and International 
Social Survey Programme) were carried out for the first time between 1981 and 1990; 
thus, the comparison now extends over a 20 to 30 year time span. This comparison, 
however, can be carried out only for those countries which have participated in the pro-
gramme from the beginning. The second approach is to interpret differences between age 
cohorts as indicators for intergenerational change. The ISSP modules on religion offer 
a third possibility for the investigation of trends in church attendance over time. These 
modules queried respondents about how often their father and their mother attended 
church when they (the respondents) were children. A look at the answers of respondents 
above the age of 60 (in the case of ISSP 2008 these are persons born before 1948) offers 
an estimate of the frequency of church attendance of adults (= respondents’ parents) in 
the period between approximately 1940 and 1960. This retrospective data allows us to 
extend the time span for the comparison across a much longer period.
 Notes:  
Regular church-attendance = at least 2-3 times per month; Respondents = church attendance 
of respondents 18 to 39 years old; Parents = church attendance of mother and father when 
respondent was a child; subgroup: respondents 60 years and older (= born before 1948)
Figure 1: Regular church attendance ca. 1940-1960 and among young adults today
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Figure 1 compares the rate of persons attending church at least 2-3 times per month in 
this age cohort (i.e. among the parents of respondents aged 60 years or older) with the 
level of church attendance among the younger age cohort of respondents (persons aged 
18 to 39 years) for all countries. In Table 2 the countries have been merged into six clus-
ters2 to reduce the complexity of the results. This table also shows the average rate3 of 
persons who never attended church or attended less than once a year.
Table 2:  Development of church attendance, from ca. 1940-1960 to the present
Country
At least 2-3 times 
per month (%)
Less than once a year, 
never (%)
1940-1960
Young 
adults 
today 
Change 1940-1960
Young 
adults 
today 
Change
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden 12 4 -8 35 62 +27
Australia, Czech Rep., Eastern-
Germany, France, GB, Hungary, 
Latvia, New Zealand, Ukraine, 
Uruguay 31 8 -23 34 66 +32
Austria, Cyprus, Flanders, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, West-Germany 62 14 -48 14 40 +26
Chile, Italy, Croatia, Northern-
Ireland, Slovakia, USA 65 31 -34 12 30 +18
Ireland, Poland 93 41 -52 1 16 +15
Dominican Rep., Mexico, Philippines, 
South-Africa 70 57 -13 10 13 +3
Notes: 
1. Table shows average percentages of church attendance across the different groups of 
countries and age cohorts.
2. 1940-1960 =  church attendance of parents of respondents aged 60 years and older; Young 
adults today = respondents 18 to 39 years.
The first cluster is composed of the four Protestant, Scandinavian countries and Ortho-
dox Russia. Here, the level of regular church attendance was very low (around 12%) 
already in the middle of the 20th century. Today, less than 4% of respondents below the 
2 This classification is based on a hierarchical cluster analysis of the countries according to the 
two indicators presented in Figure 1. 
3 The average proportion of persons who attend church regularly (who never attend church) 
corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the respective percent values in all countries of a given 
group (regardless of the size of the population and of the sample size of these countries).  
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age of 40 attend church regularly. The second and the third cluster of countries are quite 
heterogeneous in terms of geographical location and denominational structure. These 
countries comprise the German-speaking states as well as a number of ex-communist 
Eastern European countries. France, Great Britain, the two Iberian countries Portugal 
and Spain, along with Cyprus, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay all belong to one of 
these clusters. In most of these countries there is one dominant church which has had the 
position of a (Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox) state church for long historical periods, 
while in some countries, such as in Germany and Switzerland, both the Catholic and a 
Protestant Church had the position of a state church in specific parts of the country. In 
the second cluster, the level of regular church attendance was around 30% in the mid-
dle of the 20th century and has, in the meantime, declined almost to the level of the 
countries included in the first cluster. In the third cluster of countries, regular church 
attendance was at a rather high level (over 60%) until the middle of the 20th century 
and since then it has decreased rapidly to the present level of around 15%. The conver-
gence between the first three clusters of countries can also be seen from the proportion 
of persons who do not attend church at all. In the first two clusters around one third of 
the mid-20th century young adult population never attended church; while around two 
thirds of younger and middle-aged people have practically no contact with a Christian 
church. In the third cluster this rate was much lower in the period from 1940-1960, 
reaching now a level of around 40%.
The fourth and fifth cluster are composed of five countries where the Catholic Church 
has had, and, to a certain extent, continues to have the position of a popular church, 
which fosters feelings of national identity and strengthens the cohesion of the nation 
in times of external political oppression. This applies particularly to Ireland and Poland 
and to a minor degree also to Croatia, Slovakia and even Italy. Northern Ireland (where 
both the Catholic and the Anglican Church are strongly involved in the issue of national-
ism), Chile and the multidenominational USA belong to this cluster as well. In all these 
countries, church attendance was above 60% and in some cases even much higher in the 
period from 1940 to 1960. During the last decades numbers have dropped significantly, 
but still remain at a relatively high level.
The final cluster includes four non-European Countries: Mexico, Dominican Republic, 
South Africa and the Philippines. The common denominator among these countries is 
that a high percentage of the population in all of them has indigenous roots. In these 
countries the level of regular church attendance was around 70% in the period from 
1940-1960, and has only slightly decreased since that time. In the Philippines, even 
today, it still remains at the same high level. Correspondingly, the percentage of persons 
who report that they never attend church is rather low (around 10%) in these countries. 
From the results of the World Values Survey 2005, which includes a much larger number 
of non-European countries, we can deduce that most Christian (and/or Muslim) African 
countries and also most Latin American countries have similarly high levels of church 
attendance as the four countries in this last cluster. Thus, considering the entire Christian 
World, in the majority of countries the vitality of religious life remains at a very high 
level.
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For those 15 countries which already participated in the first wave of ISSP religion 
in 1991, we can trace the level of church attendance further back, to the period between 
1920 and 1940 (Höllinger, 1996). In most cases, the data of this study remain consist-
ent with the national trends described so far: In the Scandinavian countries the rate of 
church attendance was not much higher in this period than it was twenty years later; in 
the Philippines it was almost on the same level in 1920-1940 as from 1940 to 1960; in 
those countries, where there was a strong decline in church attendance from 1940-1960 
until today, the rate of attendees was even higher in the 1920-1940 period than in the 
1940-1960 period.
Explaining cross-national differences
The limited length of this paper does not permit offering detailed sociological explana-
tions for the observed cross-national differences; I can only briefly sketch some argu-
ments.
It can easily be shown with our ISSP dataset or with the World Values Survey data 
that a considerable part of the cross-national differences in church-attendance can be 
explained within the framework of secularization theory. The higher a country’s level 
of socioeconomic development (measured with indicators such as GDP per capita or the 
Human Development Index) the lower the level of regular church attendance (Inglehart 
and Baker, 2000; Höllinger, 2009). We can also see that church attendance has declined 
in almost all the countries compared over the last half century (with the only exception 
being the Philippines). According to Max Weber´s Protestantism-thesis, the correlation 
between material well-being and religiosity on the macro level of the societies can also 
be interpreted the other way around: As a consequence of the Protestant ‘disenchantment 
of the world’ (i.e. the rejection of the belief that our fate depends on supernatural forces), 
the individual’s sense of self-responsibility for his/her own fate has been strengthened. 
The new Protestant world view and ethics, in turn, have stimulated scientific develop-
ment and economic productivity (Höllinger and Haller, 2009).  
This leads us to the second set of central factors for the explanation of the national 
patterns of church attendance: the impact of the religious denomination one belongs to, 
one’s religious socialization, and the religious culture one lives in on individual religious 
behaviour. Table 3 shows the association between the denomination of the respondent´s 
mother and the frequency of church attendance of his/her parents as well as of the 
respondent him/herself (it would have been too complicated to consider the religious 
affiliation of both parents in those cases where the father and the mother have a different 
denomination). Denomination was classified in the same way as in Table 1.
Table 3 illustrates that in families where the mother was/is a member of a Protestant 
state church the level of church attendance was quite low already among the parents 
of respondents aged 60 years and older. This does not apply only to the Scandinavian 
countries, as we have seen already above, but to an attenuated degree also to the mem-
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bers of Protestant state churches in other countries. As the level of church attendance 
was low already in the middle of the 20th century, there was only a moderate decrease 
during the last half century. The low level of church attendance in these countries is 
apparently a consequence of the combination of two factors: First, the disenchantment 
of religious world views in the (European) Protestant Churches, which has favoured the 
intellectualisation of religion at the expense of communitarian religious practice, and 
which, in the long run, has also led to a decline of private religious practice. The second 
factor is that the organizational structures of a bureaucratic state church do not encour-
age individual religious zeal and commitment.
Table 3:  Regular church attendance by religious affiliation and country
Religious affiliation Country
a) Parents 
1940-60
Respondents
Change 
a-cb) 60 y + c) 18-39 y
Catholic Ireland, Poland 95 75 41 -54
Dominican Rep., Mexico, 
Philippines, South Africa 72 66 58 -14
Italy, Slovakia, Croatia, USA 64 53 32 -37
Countries with Catholic State 
Church history2 57 32 12 -45
Protestant State 
Church3
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland 12 8 3 -9
Other countries 37 22 12 -25
Orthodox Cyprus 67 63 13 -54
Latvia, Russia, Ukraine 19 13 9 -10
Other Christian 
Denomination All ISSP-countries 58 42 43 -15
Notes: 
1. Table shows average percentages of regular church attendance (= at least 2-3 times per 
month) across the different groups of countries and age cohorts
2. Countries with Catholic State Church History: Austria, Czech Rep., Germany, Flanders, France, 
Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland
3. Protestant State Church: Lutheran Church in the Scandinavian countries, Germany and 
Latvia; Anglican Church in GB, N-Ireland, Australia and New Zealand; Reformed Church in 
the Netherlands and in Switzerland
The pattern of religious behaviour of members of smaller Christian denominations, which 
are, in fact, mostly Protestant denominations, differs fundamentally from that of state-
church-Protestants. In all countries, members of small denominations had a rather high 
level of regular church attendance in the middle of the 20th century (averaging around 
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60%); this level has somewhat declined in the meantime, but remains rather high at over 
40%. A crucial factor here is the higher degree of religious motivation and zeal among 
members of small sect-like religious communities. In the multi-denominational United 
States of America and maybe also in other countries with a high level of religious plural-
ism, the market structure of religion, i.e. the competition between different churches, is 
an additional factor for the vitality of religious life. The high level of religious commit-
ment among Protestants and Pentecostals in the USA and in other Non-European coun-
tries in comparison to European Protestants, however, cannot be explained only with 
the market theory of religion, it is also related to differences in religious worldviews: 
Evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals outside Europe have a much more enchanted 
worldview and emphasize the importance of enthusiastic communitarian religious rituals 
much more than European Protestants.
Among the Orthodox populations of Cyprus, Ukraine, Russia and Latvia the rate of 
regular church attendance today is almost as low as in the Protestant countries of Europe. 
In Cyprus it was much higher in the period from 1940 to 1960 while in the three ex-
communist countries it was already relatively low during this period. According to the 
results of the World Values Survey, other ex-communist Orthodox countries in Eastern 
Europe have similar rates of church attendance as Russia and the Ukraine; however, only 
in Romania is this rate somewhat higher. The relatively low level of church attendance in 
Orthodox countries may be partly an effect of the anti-religious Communist politics and/
or possibly also related to the historical heritage of the Orthodox state church system. A 
third factor might also be important here: Orthodoxy puts more emphasis on ceremonial 
religious rituals at specific festive days (Christmas, Easter, commemoration of saints, 
etc.) than Protestantism and Catholicism. Thus, it could be assumed that many Orthodox 
Christians attend Church (only) on specific holidays. Our data confirm this assumption: 
occasional church attendance (several times per year) is much more frequent among 
Orthodox Christians than among members of Protestant state churches.
The rate of church attendance among Catholics varies markedly among different 
countries and culture areas. One determinant for these differences is the historical role 
of Catholicism in a given society. We have already seen before that church attendance is 
particularly high in those countries where the Catholic Church was an important factor 
for the maintenance of national identity and national independence. The high level of 
church attendance here reflects the positive esteem the population holds for the church. 
On the other hand, there are a number of European countries where the Catholic Church 
has had the position of a state church for a long period of their history. Following the 
same logic as before one can argue that the low level of church attendance in these 
countries is an expression of the alienation of large parts of the population from the 
Church. This alienation is not only the result of the bureaucratization of religion in state 
church systems, it may be also a long-term impact of the problematical alliance between 
Church and Crown and the manner in which the Church has enforced its interests against 
parts of the population many times throughout history (as, for example, during the 
Catholic inquisition, or in the Religion Wars in the Early Modern Times).
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The level of church attendance in Catholic countries is also related to differences in 
regard to the religious belief system and the relationship between popular and official 
religion. In those countries located close to the Protestant core of Europe (e.g. Germany, 
France, Belgium, Austria, Czech Republic) the Catholic Church has partly adopted the 
disenchanted world view of Protestantism - during the Catholic Counter-Reformation 
magical, popular religious beliefs and practices were suppressed in a similar way as in 
Protestant countries. In those Christian countries which were less affected by Reforma-
tion and Counter-Reformation, popular religion remained much more incorporated into 
the official religion (Höllinger, 1996; Sharot, 2001). This applies to Italy, the Iberian 
countries, Ireland and parts of Eastern Europe and it applies even far more strongly to 
countries with a predominantly indigenous population in Latin America, Africa and 
South East Asia.
Concluding remarks
This cross-national comparison of more than 30 Christian countries around the world 
has shown that country differences regarding the level of church attendance were larger 
in the middle of the 20th century than they are today. These differences are connected 
with the timing of the process of socio-economic development as well as with the de-
nominational structure and the historical role of the church(es) in the respective society. 
During the last 50 years, regular participation in religious community life has strongly 
declined in Europe as well as in new world countries with a predominantly white popu-
lation. This applies not only to those societies in which religious life is affected by the 
historical heritage of a state church, but also to those countries which are considered to 
be exceptions to the general trend of secularization in Western societies, such as Ireland, 
Poland and the USA. In Christian countries with a predominantly non-white population, 
however, church attendance has remained almost at the same high level as 50 years ago. 
From today´s perspective it is difficult to predict whether the Non-European Christian 
societies will maintain this pattern of religiosity also into the future, or whether religious 
community life will also decline once these societies reach similar levels of socio-econo-
mic development as the European nations.
Data
ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey Programme: Religion 
III - ISSP 2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4950 Data file Version 2.2.0, 
doi:10.4232/1.11334.
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Are Religious People Happier than Non-Religious People?
Insa Bechert 
“Every nation and each person seeks happiness 
 and wants to be happy”
Jeremy Bentham 1789
Introduction
As the English philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham stated already back 
in 1789, what makes us happy varies, across individuals as well as at a societal level 
across nations. Numerous works and studies deal with the question of what makes peo-
ple happy. On the societal level, Folklore-theory “sees happiness as the reflection of a 
body of widely held notions about life, that is part of the national character,” while the 
Livability theory says “the better the living conditions in the country the happier the 
inhabitants” (Veenhoven, 1995: 34). Of course, such factors play a role for the general 
level of happiness in a society, which in turn has an impact on the individual living in 
this society.
On the direct individual level various factors have been tested as determinants for 
happiness. Important issues, which were examined frequently over decades, often in 
combination with each other, include physical as well as mental health and religiosity 
(see for example: Abdel-Khalek, 2006; Gökce, Bastida and Gonzalez, 2004). In line with 
the topic of this Data Report, this chapter will focus on the relation of religiosity and 
happiness. To be precise, in which countries are religious people happier than non-reli-
gious people? Preceding research on this topic comes to divergent results. Some studies 
have found religiosity strongly associated with happiness while others have found no 
association at all (see Lewis and Cruise, 2006: 214 for an overview of these studies). The 
aim of this paper is to examine the question on the basis of the most recent ISSP data.
There is no classical theory offering guidance in what direction the relation between 
religiosity and happiness is to be expected. While it does seem plausible that religiosity 
and happiness should be positively associated, i.e. it should make people happy to find 
security and confirmation in their religious community and in their faith, some studies 
found religiosity associated with negative feelings, such as anxiety and fear of death 
(Pressman et al., 1992). Thus, association in both directions may be possible. 
There are different indicators of religiosity which are particularly important with 
regard to a possible association with happiness. One classical indicator for measuring 
levels of religiosity is to simply ask the respondent where they would position themselves 
on a scale (self-reporting). Another indicator is based on the argument that churches 
provide a secure environment and a community that socially integrates and supports the 
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individual. The conclusion drawn from these considerations is that it is maybe not the 
being religious, but the being involved that makes people happy. Some studies therefore 
focus on church attendance or involvement in church activities instead of self-assessed 
religiosity to examine associations with happiness (see for example Gökce, Bastida and 
Gonzalez, 2004).
ISSP data covers a wide range of countries, and an accordingly high variety of 
denominations and cultural particularities. The importance of church attendance var-
ies across denominations in general, and beyond this across countries due to national-
specific reasons. But even if church attendance does not play a role in a society, religious 
involvement might nevertheless be relevant for the individual, and might then become 
visible in the form of involvement in church activities. For these reasons, one approach 
of the following analysis will be to test both indicators, self-assessed religiosity and 
religious involvement, the latter covering church attendance as well as involvement in 
church activities, in order to find out which one is more strongly related with happiness.
The first part of this chapter will provide a general overview of self-rated religiosity, 
religious involvement and happiness levels across the 43 country samples participating 
in the ISSP 2008 module on religion. The following analyses will show whether, and if 
so, in which countries, both issues are associated. The last part of the chapter will focus 
on religious, respectively non-religious minority groups in societies. It could be argued 
that religious people might feel more comfortable and therefore happier, living among 
like-minded people. Therefore, being part of a minority group, which might not be highly 
respected by the society could create feelings of unhappiness. Based on these ideas, the 
last step of the analysis will be to examine if, on the one hand, in predominantly reli-
gious societies those who are religious might be happier than the non-religious minority 
group. And if, on the other hand, in secular societies, very religious people might be 
unhappier than the non-religious majority.
Taking into account the scope of this chapter, the analysis will concentrate on the 
pure association of personal religiosity, respectively, religious involvement and happi-
ness, consciously ignoring the fact, that, of course, a variety of other factors may inter-
actively determine an individual’s level of happiness.1
1 Regression analysis with classical socioeconomic indicators of the ISSP data set have shown 
that the respondents’ marital status has the strongest impact on happiness across almost 
all countries, closely followed by age and income. Married people tend to be happier than 
unmarried people, younger people tend to be happier than older people and those with high 
incomes tend to be happier than those with lower incomes. Multivariate analyses have shown, 
however, that in 67% of the countries also the effects for at least one of the two religious indi-
cators remains significant. In Venezuela religious involvement even has the strongest impact 
of all indicators on respondents’ happiness. 
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Data
Different, complex measurement tools for religiosity2 and happiness3 have been used in 
studies on this research topic. Some argue that finding associations (or not) depends on 
the scales used for analysis (Lewis and Cruise, 2006). The ISSP data of the modules on 
religion do not provide such complex indicators for happiness, since this is not the main 
focus of the module. There is only one item measuring happiness4 which directly asks 
the respondents: “If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or 
unhappy would you say you are, on the whole...” The answer scale ranges from 1 “very 
happy” to 4 “not at all happy”. This happiness item will be analysed in combination with 
three indicators classically utilized for measuring religiosity. The question measuring 
self-assessed religiosity5, asks the respondent: “Would you describe yourself as…” and 
the answer scale ranges from 1 “extremely religious” to 7 “extremely non-religious”. For 
measuring religious involvement an index has been generated from two indicators meas-
uring church attendance and participation in church activities. The answer scales on the 
questions how often the respondent attends church6 or takes part in church activities7 
range from 1 “never” to 9 “several times a week”. All analyses are based on the weighted 
data of the ISSP 2008 module. 
Figure 1 offers a general overview of the levels of self-assessed religiosity, religious 
involvement and happiness in societies, by presenting the mean values of all three indi-
cators on a country level. All variables are scaled from 0 (not religious, not happy) to 
100 (very religious, very happy). It is important to keep in mind when looking at the data 
outcomes of self-assessed religiosity and happiness that both indicators are self-rating 
scales and therefore highly subjective measures, which always means a challenge for 
cross-population comparability. Respondents who are asked to self-rate personal levels 
of religiosity or happiness will always be indirectly influenced by their reference group. 
If the respondent lives in a very religious society, the individual self-rating might not 
be that high, because it is compared against a highly religious environment. In turn, the 
same person living in a predominantly secular society might rate her-/himself as much 
more religious, since the general level of religiosity is that much lower. Thus, respond-
ents’ level of self-assessed religiosity as well as happiness depends on various factors. 
What respondents definitely do not do is to place themselves within an appropriate 
cross-national context. The following results are not a clear objective ranking of the 
level of the societies’ religiosity and happiness. They do, however, give a valid idea of 
respondents’ self-estimations. Moreover, although too detailed direct comparisons across 
countries should be made with caution, the measures still give a picture of whether a 
2 The Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity consists of 24 items of self-reported atti-
tudes towards the Bible, prayer, church, God and Jesus.
3 The Oxford Happiness Inventory and The Depression-Happiness Scale are 29-item, respec-
tively 25-item scales measuring the respondents’ feelings over the past week.
4 V6 in data set ZA4950.
5 V63 in data set ZA4950.
6 V60 in data set ZA4950.
7 ATTEND_EXT in data set ZA4950.
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society is rather religious or secular and whether the prevailing societal mood is more 
happy or unhappy.
The index on religious involvement is a less subjective measure, since it is based 
on respondents’ behaviour. However, it is not to be used as an equivalent indicator for 
religiosity, as is commonly done with church attendance. In some countries values for 
church attendance are higher than in others, while in some taking part in church activi-
ties is more relevant. The index presents a mean value and therefore has different, and 
in some countries, certainly lower values as only church attendance. 
Results on the aggregate level
Figure 1 shows that Turkey is the country where people report being most religious, 
while in the Eastern part of Germany, with a huge gap to the other countries, respondents 
report being least religious. 
Turkey and the Arab sample of Israel are the only Muslim societies that took part 
in the 2008 ISSP survey. But it is not simply the denomination which seems to be the 
determinant for the high level of reported religiosity. While the Turkish report being very 
religious, Israeli Arabs are far behind, but nevertheless, they still report being much more 
religious than the Jewish part of the Israeli society.
The low levels of religiosity reported in East Germany are the result of a strongly 
atheistic policy of education that propagated a non-religious world view in the times 
of the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, repression directed at believers and 
the churches themselves led to an extreme decline in church membership, and over the 
generations a decline of religiosity (Maser, 1992).
Other former socialist countries were subject to similar historical and ideological 
influences. However, the decline of religiosity in society did not necessarily take place 
to the same extent. While the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Latvia also show 
rather low levels of self-rated religiosity, respondents in Russia and Slovakia consider 
themselves as averagely neither religious nor non-religious. Poland is the outlier in this 
group of former socialist states. Here, religiosity has survived the years of atheistic poli-
cies. One reason for this is that the Catholic Church supported the opposition against 
the communist regime twenty years ago. It contributed to its breakdown and thereby 
strengthened its position as being part of Poland’s national identity (Curtis, 1994), as 
reflected by the high levels of self-reported religiosity seen in Figure 1. 
Not surprisingly, the Western and Northern European countries known to be secular 
appear more at the less religious end of the Figure. The prominent outlier here is the 
USA, displaying comparatively high levels of religiosity. One generally accepted expla-
nation for this is the great diversity of religious denominations creating a vivid compe-
tition with high levels of adherence among the churches (see for example Iannaccone, 
Finke and Stark, 1997). 
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Figure 1: Religious Involvement, Self-assessed Religiosity, and Happiness 2008  
(Mean values scaled from 0 to 100)
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Uruguay is another outlier, falling in among those countries with the lowest levels. 
While other Catholic societies in the developing world, such as Venezuela, the Domini-
can Republic and Mexico show pretty high levels of self-assessed religiosity, Uruguay 
has, in fact, long been known to be less strongly Catholic than any other country in 
Latin America (Fitzgibbon, 1953:21). The crucial factors for this development are the 
comparably small role the church played during the colonization, followed by an early 
separation of church and state in 1917.  
The three Asian countries participating in the 2008 ISSP show completely divergent 
outcomes. While the average Taiwanese respondent claims to be “somewhat religious,” 
South Korean respondents on average report being “neither religious nor non-religious,” 
while the Japanese tend to be “somewhat non-religious”. 
Although the scales for both religious indicators cannot be compared directly, the 
levels of self-assessed religiosity suggest more dominant religious behaviour in the form 
of church attendance and participation in church activities than actually reported. Espe-
cially in the predominantly Orthodox countries of Cyprus, Latvia, Russia and the Ukraine 
the differences between the levels of the two indicators appear large. This might be 
due to the fact that Orthodoxy puts special emphasis on ceremonial religious rituals on 
specific festive days (see Höllinger in this book: 56), which in turn keeps up the general 
church attendance rate and general religious involvement rather low. Also Protestantism 
does not emphasize church attendance as much as Catholicism does. 
The appearance of happiness levels across countries could probably be explained to 
some degree by means of the Folklore or Livability-theory, but that would go beyond the 
scope of this chapter. However, here is a look at the most noteworthy results:
Mexico and Ireland are the countries where people report being most happy, while 
respondents in the Ukraine and, interestingly, in Turkey report being most unhappy. This 
is interesting because Turkey is the country with the highest level of reported religiosity, 
so, therefore, one might already think of a negative association between the two issues.
Another notable outcome from this data is that almost all former socialist Eastern 
European countries tend to show very low levels on the happiness scale. While the mean 
value for self-reported happiness over all ISSP countries is 68, the former socialist East-
ern European countries8 (East Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Russia and the Ukraine) together report a mean happiness value of 58. Only the 
Polish are comparably happy, with a mean value of 71.
8 The term “Eastern European” might not be absolutely appropriate for Russia and East Ger-
many. Nevertheless, in terms of cultural history, these countries have strong similarities and 
therefore belong together in this group.
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Association between the two concepts
In general, the overview of the aggregate level reveals that the countries with high levels 
of reported religiosity are not necessarily those with high levels of happiness and vice 
versa. Therefore, the next step of the analysis, to find out if religious people are actually 
happier than non-religious people, will be to look at the correlations between these two 
concepts. 
Table 1 shows the Pearson Correlation coefficients of the two different aspects of 
religiosity and the happiness item. All indicators are scaled in the same direction, which 
means positive correlations indicate the more religious respondents are, the happier they 
are, while negative correlations indicate lower levels of happiness among more religious 
people. The table lists only those countries showing significant correlations. 
An initial look at the table quickly reveals some general findings. The first is that, 
over all countries, the associations between religiosity and happiness are not exceedingly 
high. Second, with Portugal being the only exception, all correlations point in the same 
direction: if there is any association, religious, or religiously involved people in all coun-
tries tend to be happier than non-religious people. The third interesting finding is that 
there are considerably more countries displaying substantial correlations for religious 
involvement and happiness than for self-assessed religiosity and happiness. 
A comparison of both columns reveals that apart from the Israeli Jewish sample, with 
the highest correlation of all countries (.21), only in the Dominican Republic, Portugal, 
Poland, Uruguay, Turkey and Denmark is self-assessed religiosity more highly associated 
with happiness than religious involvement. Also South Africa, Croatia, South Korea and 
the USA show some substantial correlations between these items, however, the asso-
ciations with religious involvement are stronger. What does stand out is that for the 
majority of the countries ranking high on the involvement index, the correlations with 
self-assessed religiosity are hardly noteworthy. These data outcomes are particularly 
surprising since we have seen in Figure 1 that generally levels of religious involvement 
are not very high.
The analysis shows that in 27 out of 43 ISSP countries or country samples religious or 
religiously involved people are happier than non-religious people. Portugal is the only 
exception in terms of the direction of this association. Here we find a significant nega-
tive correlation for both indicators, meaning the more religious the Portuguese respond-
ents are; the unhappier they report being. In the remaining 16 countries, however, no 
significant associations between any of the tested indicators on religiosity, and happi-
ness can be observed. 
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Table 1: Pearson Correlations of two indicators of religiosity and happiness
Countries
Correlations 
self-assessed religiosity and 
happiness
Correlations 
religious involvement index 
and happiness
Israel, Jews .21 *** .12 ***
Northern Ireland .07 ** .18 ***
Australia .06 ** .14 ***
South Korea .08 *** .13 ***
Switzerland .06 ** .12 ***
Portugal -.12 *** -.08 **
Netherlands .11 ***
South Africa .09 *** .11 ***
United States .08 *** .11 ***
Dominican Republic .11 *** .06 ***
New Zealand .11 ***
Croatia .09 *** .10 ***
Venezuela .10 ***
Germany-East .09 **
Japan .09 ***
Ireland .09 ***
Finland .08 ***
Germany-West .08 ***
Flanders .08 ***
Latvia .07 **
Poland .09 *** .07 **
Ukraine .07 ***
Uruguay .06 **
Turkey .06 **
France .05 ** .05 **
Denmark .05 ** .05 **
Great Britain .05 **
Significant levels ***< .010; **<.050
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Denominations
One important question that comes to mind is whether the prevailing denomination 
plays a role for the strength of association between religiosity and happiness in the dif-
ferent countries. Perhaps belonging to one denomination is more satisfying than belong-
ing to another denomination. The data reveals particularly strong correlations among 
the Jewish Israeli. Unfortunately, no other country has as many Jewish respondents in 
the sample as would be necessary to examine whether this is due to the denomination. 
However, a study by Francis and Katz, examining a sample of female Israeli Hebrew 
speaking undergraduate students, also found that those who held a positive attitude 
towards Judaism tend to be happier people (Francis and Katz, 2002).
The country with the largest sample of Muslims is Turkey. Turkey does not show any 
substantial correlation between religiosity and happiness and neither does the Muslim 
sample of Israel. Taking into account the fact that the Turks report being very religious 
and at the same time very unhappy, one would expect a strong negative association. 
It seems that there must be other crucial factors for the reported unhappiness. Studies 
among Muslims of other nationalities, however, attest Muslims a positive association of 
religiosity and happiness (see for example Abdel-Khalek, 2006).
Most ISSP member countries are predominantly Christian. But a look at Christian 
societies also does not provide much insight as to whether or not a denomination is the 
determinant of association between religiosity and happiness. Nor can a clear pattern be 
discovered among the Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox countries. Among the Protestant 
Scandinavian countries only Finland shows substantial correlations. Of the other pre-
dominantly European Protestant countries it is only the Netherlands. And also the group 
of South American, predominantly Roman Catholic countries do not appear homoge-
neously. While neither Mexico, nor Chile or Uruguay shows any relevant correlations 
between religiosity and happiness, Venezuela does. Furthermore, the highly Catholic 
European countries of Spain and Italy do not show any noteworthy correlations, while 
Portugal is the only country where negative correlations can be observed. 
Looking at the Asian countries, South Korea and Japan show significant associations, 
while Taiwan does not. But here the denominational landscape does not allow for a 
general statement on a specific denomination anyway, since the population is too het-
erogeneous. The only denomination that has a considerable membership rate in all Asian 
ISSP countries is Buddhism. However, a check on only the Asian Buddhist respondents 
reveals that the associations of religiosity and happiness stay at the same level as when 
looking at the whole society in South Korea and Taiwan, while it disappears in Japan.
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Religious and non-religious minorities
The last part of the analysis will offer a look at the minority groups in societies; religious 
or non-religious. The thesis is that very religious people are happier than non-religious 
minority groups in predominantly religious societies. Conversely, the expectation is to 
find people who are very religious in predominantly secular societies to be less happy 
than those belonging to the non-religious majority.
The thesis is examined on the basis of the eight countries with the lowest and the 
eight countries with the highest levels of self-assessed religiosity as presented in Figure 
1. For each country, the indicator of religiosity which turned out to be more relevant in 
that particular country is used. According to the previous results this is predominantly 
religious involvement. To allow comparability with the outcomes in Figure 1, happiness 
ranges from 0 “not at all happy” to 100 “very happy.” Table 2 presents in columns A and 
B the mean values of happiness among very religious, and respectively, non-religious 
groups in the sixteen societies. Column C shows the differences between these happiness 
values.
The table clearly illustrates that the levels of happiness do not vary a lot, even between 
the distinguished groups. Nevertheless, for the religious countries the thesis seems to 
hold. In all eight religious countries very religious people tend to be happier than the 
non-religious minorities. On average, religious groups, with 8.6% points, are happier 
than the non-religious groups, while the most substantial differences occur in Cyprus 
and Croatia with 14.8%, and 11.4% points, respectively. 
However, a look at the secular societies reveals that the reverse argument does not 
hold for the majority of countries. According to the theory, very religious people should 
tend to be unhappier in the more secular countries, which is the case only in the Czech 
Republic and East Germany. Here religious people report being slightly less happy than 
the non-religious majority. In the other secular countries religious people tend to be 
happier (averaging 4.8% points) than their non-religious neighbours, similar to the reli-
gious societies. Especially in Japan and France these differences are with 12.8% and 
8.8% points, respectively, quite substantial and even on the same level as in some highly 
religious societies. 
There is no easy, general explanation for these outcomes. National-specific reasons, 
such as levels of religious tolerance might be crucial factors here. It could indeed be the 
fact that the societies of Cyprus, Croatia, the Philippines and South Africa are highly 
religious that makes religious people feel happier than the non-religious minority. In 
the same vein it could be high levels of religious tolerance in secular countries, such as 
Japan or France that keep religious minorities happy despite the secular environment.
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Table 2: Levels of happiness among the religious and non-religious groups in religious, respec-
tively, secular societies      9   10
A B C
Very religious people9 Non-religious people10 A-B
Religious societies
Poland* 73.5 67.2 6.3
Turkey* 53.6 49.5 4.1
Philippines 72.0 60.9 11.1
South Africa 66.5 57.2 9.3
Cyprus 75.1 60.3 14.8
Croatia 74.0 62.6 11.4
Taiwan 73.4 68.1 5.3
United States 83.5 77.4 6.1
Secular societies
Great Britain 79.2 73.1 6.1
Denmark* 76.6 69.2 7.4
Japan 79.0 ** 66.2 12.8
Sweden 76.3 71.4 4.9
Uruguay 72.8 70.4 2.4
France 72.8 ** 64.0 8.8
Czech Republic* 59.6 61.3 -1.7
East Germany 60.2 *** 62.6 -2.4
*self-assessed religiosity;**N<20; ***N<10
9 Very religious people are those who reported being extremely or very religious, or who attend 
church or participate in church activities several times a week or every week.
10 Non-religious groups contain those who consider themselves to be extremely non-religious or 
very non-religious or are never involved, or involved less than once a year in church activities 
or attend religious services.
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Conclusion
The analyses show that in the majority of ISSP member countries religiosity is not very 
strongly related with happiness. However, if there are noteworthy associations they are 
almost always positive: Religious people tend to be happier than non-religious people. 
The only exception to this rule is Portugal. The question why the Portuguese tend to be 
unhappier the more religious they are, remains open. Representative of the society as a 
whole, 86% of the respondents in the Portuguese ISSP sample are Roman Catholic. The 
second largest group contains those who report having no religion. Other denominations 
taken together account for only 4% of the sample. A closer look at the data reveals that 
none of the denominational minority groups bias the correlation of religiosity and hap-
piness. For whatever reason, it is the group of very religious Portuguese Roman Catholics 
which is substantially unhappier than the rest of the society.
Another interesting result revealed by the analysis is that in the majority of coun-
tries, it is rather religious involvement that is associated with happiness than pure, self-
assessed religiosity. Being part of a religious community and taking part in their activi-
ties, be it religious services or other events, seems to be a more important factor for 
happiness than the existence or non-existence of pure faith.
The last question examined in this chapter was regarding how happy very religious 
or non-religious minority groups are in predominantly secular or religious societies. 
The data outcomes support the thesis that very religious people are happier than non-
religious people in predominantly religious societies. However, in six out of eight secular 
countries, the religious minorities are happier as well. This investigation, once more, 
makes clear that generalizations over a wide range of heterogeneous countries can 
hardly reveal homogenous patterns. Further investigation will be necessary to find the 
country specific reasons behind the national data outcomes.
Data
ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey Programme: Religion 
III - ISSP 2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4950 Data file Version 2.2.0, 
doi:10.4232/1.11334.
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Do Modernization and Religious Competition Affect 
Religious Change?
An Exploratory Analysis of the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998 and 2008
Wolfgang Jagodzinski
Introduction1
Religious change has become a key issue in comparative cultural research (Bruce 2011; 
Chaves 2011; Inglehart and Norris, 2011; Pollack and Olson 2008; Stark and Finke 2005). 
The data outcomes in Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere’s (1995) investigation of religious 
change in the last century in Western Europe clearly indicated a decline in religiosity. 
Long-term sequences of national surveys could only be generated for church attendance 
or religious participation for a small number of Western European countries, but these 
time series delivered the same clear and unequivocal message: Church integration, a 
variable derived from church attendance, is declining. 
Is the observed religious change confined to postwar Western Europe, or is this a 
general, long-term trend occurring in other advanced societies as well?2 It is only since 
the 1980s that large international survey programmes started to regularly investigate 
religiosity. ISSP data can offer some valuable insights into the structure of religious 
change. The following study will not investigate the full spectrum of ISSP-countries but 
only focus on a few religious economies which have played a major role in the recent 
controversy on religious change: Norway as a Scandinavian Lutheran monopoly; Ireland 
and Italy as Catholic monopolies; the Netherlands as a religiously mixed country; the 
United States as a society with a highly competitive religious market; and finally Japan, 
a country with non-congregational religions. Is the pattern of religious change in these 
countries more compatible with the secularization thesis or with the economic theory 
of religion? A brief elaboration of the type of change expected in both frameworks will 
precede an empirical look at this question. 
1 I would like to thank André Schaffrin for his help on the data sets and literature research.
2 See Gorki and Altinordu (2008) for an overview of historical research on religious change in 
Europe and the United States.
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Expected religious participation levels and expected  
religious change
Economic theories of religion
Stark (1999) has convincingly called into question the thesis of a centuries-long religious 
decline since the Middle Ages (see also Gorki and Altinordu 2008). Iannaccone (1988; 
1991) has inferred from a supply-side theory of religious markets that religious monopo-
lies like the former state churches in Scandinavia or state-subsidized churches, like in 
Germany, are detrimental to religious participation because they prevent or hinder reli-
gious competition. Religious decline is not a consequence of the modernization process 
but may be the result of imperfect religious markets. For empirical support Iannaccone, 
Stark and Finke (1997) contrasted Western Europe with three countries in which the reli-
gious markets had been liberalized before or after World War II: United States, Japan and 
South Korea. While religious activity in Sweden is rather low, religion seemed to flourish 
in the latter three countries. The economic approach considers religious competition3 as 
the driving motor behind religious change. 
The present study accepts the countries’ ranking order as derived by Stark and his 
colleagues from their assessment of religious competition: high in the United States 
and low in Protestant European countries. Accordingly, religious participation, the core 
dependent variable of the economic approach, should display a similar pattern: high in 
the United States and low in North-Western Europe. Catholic monopolies are provision-
ally accepted as exceptions to the rule that religious participation is low in religious 
monopolies. The internal competition among Catholic orders (Iannaccone, 1991); the 
strong dependency of Catholic priests on the laity (Stark and Finke, 2000: 243); or the 
capability of the Catholic Church to serve religious niches (Stark and Finke, 2000: 215) 
may keep religious participation at high levels in Catholic societies. It is also accepted 
that religious participation may not strongly covary with the regulation of the religious 
markets in Asia because Asian religions are “un-churched,” i.e. they lack a congrega-
tional life and a specific religious creed (Stark, Hamberg, and Miller 2005: 7; Lu, Johnson 
and Stark, 2008).4 We therefore do not expect high levels of religious participation in 
Japan despite the fact that the Japanese religious market has been liberalized after World 
War II. 
Thus, religious participation should be high in Catholic countries and in competitive 
religious economies like the United States, but low in Protestant monopolies and Asian 
countries. As far as change over time is concerned, the market theory allows for increases 
3 The more easily information on such pre-conditions of competition is obtained, the less it 
reflects competition. The German constitution, for instance, guarantees religious freedom as a 
fundamental right. Nevertheless Germany has no free and open religious market because the 
churches are state subsidized. 
4 Whether this is due to different preferences or portfolios of religious believers, different stra-
tegies of the religious firms (Iannaccone, 1995) or different cultural traditions remains open 
for now.
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and decreases in religiousness. However, “…, its usual prediction is for relatively stable 
levels of religious commitment in societies” (Stark and Finke, 2000: 68). Changes in 
religious competition, if they occur, should produce gradual and long-term change. The 
effects of religious regulations, in particular, are long-lived: “Even after a state church 
is disestablished and the religious market is legally opened, it may take generations for 
the situation to approach that of a perfectly competitive market.” And furthermore: “… 
the tendency to remain within an inefficient church can persist over generations” (Ian-
naccone, 1991: 163). What is true for an increase in competition and efficiency should 
also hold true for a gradual decline and deterioration of religious products – except it is 
caused by political suppression of religions which can also prevent lay people from fur-
ther participation. Thus, short-term changes are difficult to explain within the theory of 
religious markets. The same holds for generational differences which are not caused by 
changes in religious competition. Differences between older and younger people do not 
necessarily falsify the theory because they can often be explained as life-cycle effects 
(cf., for instance, Iannaccone, 1991; 1988). As confidence in religious explanations 
increases with religious participation (Stark and Finke, 2000: 107, proposition 23); the 
core beliefs of a religion should by and large be affected by the same factors as religious 
participation (see Iannaccone, 1991) and also display a similar stability over time. 
The secularization thesis
Most secularization theses relate religious change to master trends like modernization, 
functional differentiation, privatization, individualization or rationalization. They have, 
however, been no more successful in measuring the underlying concepts than their rivals 
in measuring religious competition.5 Typical modernization indicators do not vary very 
much in the countries included in this study. Accordingly, higher levels of religious 
participation may be expected in Ireland and Italy, and lower levels in the Netherlands 
and Norway. The United States is recognized as an exceptional case for which several 
explanations have been offered (cf. Bruce 1997; 2004). Japan is largely a white spot in 
secularization literature so that little can be said about its religious ranking.
Further decline in religious participation can be expected for at least as long as pro-
cesses of functional differentiation and rationalization continue. Ireland’s progress and 
amazing economic and human development through 2008 leads to the expectation of 
a somewhat faster religious decline in Ireland. Religious trends and generational dif-
ferences should be somewhat more pronounced. A sudden religious decline is a lesser 
problem for the secularization thesis because religious doubts can accumulate over long 
periods and remain invisible until suddenly spilling over in manifest behaviour. 
To what extent other religious activities or religious beliefs share the same fate as 
church attendance is not completely settled in the secularization approach. Adherents 
of the privatization theses first expect to observe decay in public practices like church 
5 Indicators of economic development like GNP or GDP per capita do not reflect rationalization, 
for instance, because they are also dependent on the natural resources of a country such as 
oil. 
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attendance, but not necessarily a similar change in private practices like praying. Some 
religious beliefs may also persist – people, in other words, may believe without belong-
ing to a public visible religion (see Davies, 1994). Others observe the rise of a new spir-
ituality which places higher emphasis on personal religious experiences and goes hand 
in hand with a profound value change (see Siegers, 2012 with further references). If 
new beliefs and practices emerge, the old ones have to be abolished or transformed and 
decline accordingly. The main stream nevertheless assures that all traditional religious 
practices and beliefs are affected in the same way as church attendance in the seculari-
zation process.
A third perspective
Thus far it has been argued that religious practices and beliefs should display similar 
patterns over time – stability according to the economic approach or decline according 
to the theory of secularization. Yet, it is at least equally plausible that some religious 
practices undergo profound changes in a globalizing world, while others remain fairly 
stable. Schwadel (2011) has recently detected traces of generational change in religious 
participation and the frequency of prayer in the United States: As older generations 
practice more often than younger, generational replacement will lead to a decline of both 
practices in the United States. The belief in a life after death, by contrast, reveals a differ-
ent pattern: This belief is high among both very old and very young cohorts so that there 
is no indication of a long-term decline. And while the author cannot offer an explana-
tion for the differential developments it should be kept in mind as a third possibility. 
Empirical analysis
Which of the three alternatives is supported by the ISSP data? Unfortunately the joint 
ISSP reference scale for religious participation has been changed: While in the first two 
modules it did not differentiate between once a week and more, the category “more than 
once a week” was added in 2008 in a number of countries. In order to improve compa-
rability over time, the joint reference scale is dichotomized by distinguishing between 
respondents who attended religious services less than once a month and those who 
attended more often.6 The cut-off point “once a month” is relatively precisely defined 
and probably not affected by changes in neighbouring categories. It also indicates a 
certain amount of religious commitment, while people who attend religious services 
less often, say, on major holidays only, may do it as a custom or habit or for other 
non-religious reasons. Let us therefore refer to respondents above the cut-off points as 
religiously committed people for the sake of brevity.
6 Alternatively, a scale with four categories may be considered: never; rarely (less than once a 
moth), once a month or more; weekly (or more). 
GESIS Series  |  Volume 13 77
 Religious Attitudes and Religious Change
Religious participation
Figure 1 displays the proportion of religiously committed respondents for the countries 
and time points. The countries’ order on the horizontal axis corresponds to the theoreti-
cally expected order: The two Catholic monopolies, Ireland and Italy as well as the United 
States, should display higher levels of religious participation than the Netherlands, Nor-
way and Japan7. The vertical axis represents the proportions of religiously committed 
persons. For each country and time point this proportion is depicted as a small circle. 
The whiskers of each circle indicate the 95% confidence interval for a random sample. In 
Ireland 80% of the respondents were religiously committed in 1991. The figure dropped 
to 61% in 2008. Nevertheless, Ireland in 2008 still remains the most religious among the 
six countries. Japan at the top of the figure, by contrast, never reaches the ten percent 
level of religious commitment.  
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Figure 1:  Religious Participation in Japan, the United States, and four West European Countries
 Results from the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998, and 2008
As far as the country levels are concerned, the rank order is consistent with the theo-
retical expectations derived from the economic theory of religion: The two Catholic 
7 Since Japan participated in the ISSP first in 1993 there is no data for 1991.
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monopolies, Ireland and Italy, display relatively high proportions of religiously commit-
ted persons; the United States follows more or less on the same level as Italy; with the 
Netherlands fourth; and Japan and Norway coming up last with percentages of about 
10% and less. The only surprise is that Ireland, as one of the Catholic monopolies, dis-
plays an even higher level of religious participation than the United States. Apparently, 
the conflict between Ireland and Great Britain has generated more religious commitment 
than religious competition on an unregulated market (see also below!). The rank order 
of countries is also compatible with the secularization thesis because the economically 
and technically more advanced societies also have lower levels of religious participation, 
with one exception: only the United States seems to disconfirm the secularization thesis. 
Yet, Bruce (1997; 2011) and others can offer a range of arguments as to why the United 
States is actually compatible with the thesis.
As for religious change within countries, with the exception of Japan where religious 
commitment has marginally increased between 1998 and 2008, the pattern is the same 
everywhere: Religious commitment has declined by more than 25% in Ireland (from 88% 
to 61%), between 7% and 9% in the Netherlands, Italy and the United States, and by 
less than 5% in Norway. It is true, the economic approach does not exclude a religious 
decline but it is hard to believe that the observed change is a consequence of reduced 
religious competition.
Figure 2 illustrates the proportions of religiously committed persons of different gen-
erations. In each country only two groups of generations, the war-/ prewar and the 
postwar generation, have been distinguished to keep the distorting effect of sampling 
and measurement errors as small as possible.8 While there are other meaningful cut-off 
points which differ from country to country, the end of World War II was a watershed 
for almost all of them. The proportions of religiously committed people are displayed as 
grey triangles for the postwar generations, born after 1945, and as black circles for the 
war-/ prewar generations.
Five out of six countries show fairly large generational differences. The exception, 
Norway, is consistent with the economic theory in so far as religious participation is 
low among all generations. The Japanese pattern is consistent with the theory which 
includes age as an important determinant: Age effects may result in an intra-cohort 
increase of religious participation and lower religiousness of the postwar generations. It 
is more difficult to explain the huge generational differences in Ireland using the eco-
nomic approach. Stark and Finke argue that intra- and international religious conflicts 
can be conducive to religious participation and has worked in this way in Ireland: “The 
celebrated Irish piety … arose subsequent to the Potato Famine [1845-51, WJ] when the 
Catholic Church became the primary organizational vehicle for Irish nationalism resist-
ing external domination” (Stark and Finke, 2000: 241).9 This function of the Catholic 
8 Note that the war-/ pre-war generations are not strictly comparable across countries because 
some countries have introduced age limits: In the first Italian wave only respondents of age 
70 and below have been included, the Norwegian population consisted of people between 18 
and 80, and in the United States people above 90 were excluded.
9 Irish religiousness was quite low up to the middle of the 19th century.
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Church, it might be argued, has been in decline since the so-called Good Friday agree-
ment of 1998. Yet, Stark and Finke have observed that conflicts with England continued 
and therefore did “… not expect the onset of a very substantial decline” (2000: 240-241). 
The decline, however, is substantial! 
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Figure 2:  Religious Participation in Pre- and Postwar Generations 
Results from the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998, and 2008
Internal conflicts between the religious pillars have kept religious participation at high 
levels in the pre-World War II Netherlands (Stark and Finke, 2000: 241-3). With the 
breakdown of the pillars seen around 1970, religion lost its function as a source of identi-
fication. Ireland and the Netherlands may be viewed as borderline cases which still fit the 
economic theory, but the patterns of religious change in Italy and the United States pose 
insoluble problems for the economic theory of religion. Even though Italy has a partly 
regulated religious market, religious participation in the war-/ prewar generations is still 
higher than in the United States. Is the internal organization of the Catholic Church more 
effective than the market competition? And why, above all, do we not only observe fairly 
large intergenerational differences in Italy and the United States, but also declining pro-
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portions of religiously committed persons in the postwar generations between 1991 and 
2008? Neither religious competition nor religious conflicts have changed that much dur-
ing the last decades in these two countries! So the economic approach lacks a convincing 
explanation. To be sure, cohort differences could also be a result of age differences. Even 
if there are large cohort differences in the sense that later born cohorts display lower lev-
els of religious commitment, and even if these cohort levels remain perfectly stable over 
time, this could be the result of age and period effects. Yet if we resorted to a life-cycle 
explanation in this particular case we would have to identify period effects so strong that 
they not only conceal the life-cycle change towards more religious participation in each 
generation but even induce a religious decline in younger generations. And these so-
called short-term period effects would work for nearly two decades already in the same 
direction. It is inconceivable how this pattern can be explained by the economic theory.
The secularization thesis obviously has lesser problems with the observed genera-
tional change which by and large seems to confirm the thesis that modernization erodes 
religiosity and religious participation. There are indeed good reasons to assume that 
increasing mobility as well as modern forms of communication via the internet may 
undermine regular church attendance. Increased mobility makes it more difficult to meet 
regularly at places of worship. Whether this also implies a loss of community and social 
capital remains to be seen. It does not necessarily imply, in any case, a loss of religiosity. 
In the future, part of religious communication will take place in the virtual world, and 
face to face meetings may become more sporadic. 
Frequency of prayer
It is a short step to infer from the previous considerations that prayer should display a 
pattern of change different from that shown by religious practice. The latter is public and 
restricted to particular places while prayers can be spoken anywhere – in private or in 
public; at home; one’s workplace; out in nature; or in a holy place. Prayer as an expres-
sion should therefore be affected by processes of post-modernization and globalization 
to a lesser extent than religious participation. Is this true?
Frequency of prayer is measured in the ISSP using an 11-point scale running from 1 
“never” to 11 “several times a day”. Figure 3 reports the averages for each time point in 
each country. No figure is displayed for the second ISSP module in Ireland because the 
1998 Irish survey used a slightly different scale. Contrary to expectations differences 
between war-/ prewar and postwar generations are to be seen in all countries. In the four 
West European countries the frequency of prayer seems to decline in the postwar genera-
tions, while it is rather stable in Japan. The classification of Japan as an un-churched 
religion (Stark, Hamberg and Miller, 2005) is confirmed in so far as Japan now appears, 
compared to the other countries, somewhat more religious. Yet, extremely large differ-
ences can be observed between postwar and older generations. This comes as a surprise 
since the liberalization of the religious market after World War II should have had its 
strongest impact on the postwar generations. In fact, they pray, but on average much less 
frequently than the war-/ prewar generations.
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The pattern seen for the United States deviates most from the previous pattern. While 
there are clear signs of a decline in religious participation among the American postwar 
generations, we observe exactly the opposite in Figure 3: Younger American cohorts 
seem to pray more frequently as they age! This pattern is consistent with the results of 
Schwadel (2011: 186, Table 1, and 188, Fig. 3) whose study shows strong age effects in 
the early stages of life. The cohort effects of the prewar generations differ markedly from 
those generations born after World War II, but there is little variation of these effects in 
the postwar generations. Those born after World War II pray less often than those born 
earlier, but Schwadel’s Table 1 does not show a substantial further decline among the 
postwar generations. Life cycle effects can really be seen only in the United States and 
considerably weaker, in Japan. They may exist elsewhere too, but are then completely 
concealed by period effects working in the opposite direction.
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
P
r
a
y
in
g
1
8
6
4
2
0
Born
before 1946
after 1945
 
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
8
Ireland Italy United States Netherlands Norway Japan
Country and Year of the Survey
Error Bars: 95% CI
Notes: 
Praying is a labelled 11-point scales, running from 1 (=never) to 11 (=several times a day);  
Data are missing in 1998 in Ireland because a different scale was used.  
Grey, dotted bars: Postwar generations born after 1945; black, solid bars: War and prewar 
generations
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Belief in life after death
Religious practices differ largely between cultures and many religious beliefs do so to an 
even larger degree. The God of monotheistic religions has little in common with the Gods 
in Asian folk religions (Stark, 2000) and Jesus Christ may not even be known to Asian 
lay people. Most religions however entail the concept of a life after death even though an 
afterlife may not be the ultimate and most desirable state. The question whether people 
believe in a life after death seems therefore better suited to cross-cultural comparisons 
than many other belief questions. It is one of the advantages of the ISSP question (Do 
you believe in life after death) that it takes religious doubts of people about the trans-
cendent world into account, offering four rank-ordered response alternatives: (1) Yes, 
definitely; (2) Yes, probably; (3) No, probably not; (4) No, definitely not. The further 
alternative “Can’t choose” is mentioned quite often and usually coded as a missing value. 
In this particular case, however, it can also be interpreted as a middle category where 
people assign a probability of about 50% to the afterlife. In the following analysis such a 
5-point scale has been created running from 0 “no, definitely not” to 4 “yes, definitely”. 
2 is the midpoint of the scale corresponding to the assignment of a 50:50 probability.
There is a striking difference between Figure 4 and the previous figures. First, we 
find virtually no differences between postwar and older generations with the exception 
of Ireland and Japan. In Ireland postwar generations believe somewhat less strongly in 
afterlife yet compared to the gaps we have previously found, the distances to the older 
generations remain relatively small. Furthermore, there is no continuous decline over 
time and the averages remain quite stable on a fairly high level. Japanese averages are 
where quite a few researchers would expect them to be, i.e. close to the midpoint of the 
scale. It is nevertheless remarkable that the averages move upward between 1998 and 
2008 in war-/ prewar and postwar generations. Furthermore, the belief in an afterlife is 
more wide-spread in the younger than in older Japanese generations. There are no signs 
of a continuous religious decline in Japan.
The Norwegian pattern is consistent with the secularization thesis in so far as Figure 
3 displays a continuous decline between 1991 and 2008. However, it is mainly a move-
ment to the midpoint of maximal doubt, not towards the rejection of religious beliefs. 
Furthermore, the belief seems to change in younger and older generations with the same 
speed, which is very untypical for a long-term religious change. The remaining countries 
perfectly correspond to the expectations of the economic approach whereby differences 
between generations seem fairly small if they exist at all.10 Furthermore, the averages 
remain fairly stable over time. And finally the rank order among the three countries 
is consistent with the theoretical expectations. The Catholic monopoly Ireland, where 
Catholicism served for a long-time as a source of national identification, and the highly 
10 Schwadel (2011: 189, Table 2, and 190, Fig. 4) estimates stronger cohort effects for the youn-
gest and oldest generations in the United States which may remain concealed in this study 
because we have only distinguished two generations. Future analyses have to show whether 
the very strong effects for the generations born between 1977 and 1982 found by Schwadel 
really are persistent generational differences.
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competitive religious market in the United States display higher levels of religious belief 
than Italy where the religious market is still restricted to some extent.
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Figure 4:  Belief in a Life after Death in Pre- and Postwar Generations 
Results from the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998, and 2008
Summary and conclusions
This paper has explored religious change in a selected number of countries. The investi-
gation is framed by two competing theses. The first, which has been called the seculari-
zation thesis, asserts a decline of all traditional forms of religious behaviour like church 
attendance or prayer as well as the corresponding religious beliefs in the process of mod-
ernization or post-modernization. This is only one out of many secularization theses, all 
of which maintain a decline of religion – be it on the macro-, the meso-, or micro-level. 
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Both frameworks, the secularization thesis and the supply side theory of religion, still 
lack adequate operationalization of their key concepts. Neither the concepts of func-
tional differentiation and rationalization in the first, nor the concept of religious compe-
tition in the latter approach have been validly measured. As a consequence researchers 
usually stay with the assumption that rationalization changes parallel with economic or 
human development, and that religious competition remains on the same level as long 
as there are no major changes in the religious regulations or in the number of religious 
competitors. As the latter have not occurred in the countries under investigation, the lack 
of long-term differences between generations and a constant level of religious activities 
is predicted by the economic theory. Similar empirical evidence has been presented in 
the preceding analysis not only for the United States but also for most of the remaining 
countries, particularly also for Ireland and Italy. Religious participation was never very 
high in so-called un-churched societies like Japan but it appears to now be in decline in 
a larger number of advanced Christian societies too. This change cannot be explained by 
the endogenous variables of the supply side theory of religion. It is detrimental to this 
theory as long as religious participation is kept as the key dependent variable. A refor-
mulation of the theory for a broader spectrum of religious activities and orientations 
should therefore be considered. 
To be sure, the changes in religious participation and the frequency of prayer fit the 
secularization thesis better than the economic theory of religion in the six countries 
under investigation. However, this is not empirical evidence that religiousness in gen-
eral will disappear with modernization. Beliefs in afterlife show decline only in Norway, 
remaining amazingly stable in half of the countries. In Ireland we find generational dif-
ferences but the averages are still very high in the postwar generations. And in Japan, 
younger generations on average believe more strongly in a life after death than the war-/ 
prewar generations. There is no doubt that a social transformation of religiousness is 
under way, but it is certainly not a unidirectional change towards unbelief. What can be 
clearly stated is that so far none of the existing theories of religion allows a prediction 
about the future fate of religion. 
Data
ISSP Research Group (2011): International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III - 
ISSP 1991-1998-2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5070 Data file Version 1.0.0, 
doi:10.4232/1.10860.
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Appendix: Variables 
Variable Name Description Range
Year of birth Birthyear Recoded from V4 (age) 1897-1992
Postwar generation CohD1 0=born 1945 or earlier;  
1=born 1946 or later
0-1
Believe in afterlife? afterlife Recoded from v30
0=no, definitely not; 1=no, probably not; 
2=don’t know; 3=yes, probably; 4=yes, definitely
0-4
Religious participation chatt 1=once a month or more;  
0=less than once a month;
Recoded of attend
0-1
How often Resp. prays pray V49; 1=Never; 2=Less than once a year; 3=About 
once or twice a year; 4=Several times a year; 
5=About once a month; 6=2-3 times a month; 
7=Nearly every week; 8=Every week; 9=Several 
times a week; 10=Once a day; 11=Several times a 
day; Not available 1998 in Ireland
1-11
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Assessing Trends in Religiosity with ISSP Data 
An Addendum1
Markus Quandt and Insa Bechert
Introduction
The first of the two main objectives of this brief concluding chapter is to describe the 
development of church-related religiosity over the longest time span possible with the 
available ISSP data, beginning from 1985/86 to 2010. This information is offered in an 
effort to complement some of the statements on trends made in the remaining chapters 
of this volume by embedding them into an even longer time horizon. A second, related, 
objective is to discuss some of the methodological and practical challenges confronted 
in that type of analysis, with that type of data.
All preceding chapters rely on a particular study series within the ISSP programme: 
surveys from the years 1991, 1998, and 2008. These datasets were specifically collected 
(and later cumulated) with the purpose of describing and understanding religious atti-
tudes, religious behaviours and religious change in the ISSP member countries. Conse-
quently, they offer rich material for assessing both the nature and degree of religiosity 
displayed by societies and their individual citizens, enabling our authors, in turn, to 
examine specific aspects of religiosity. For example, authors Franz Höllinger and Wolf-
gang Jagodzinski, look at, among other things, the behavioural side of church attend-
ance as an active, and somewhat public act representing a certain degree of commitment 
to one’s religion and denomination. Whereas Tom W. Smith focuses on the personal or 
‘spiritual’ side of beliefs in God – which can also be held silently and privately. Jonas 
Edlund’s contribution draws on rather generic metaphysical beliefs to tap into subjective 
religiosity in a way not specific to particular religions. That relative wealth of measures 
on religiosity, however, speaks not only to a variety of related, but distinguishable theo-
retical questions. Using different indicators for the same theoretical concept can also be 
seen as insurance against the pitfalls that come with measuring a concept of interest by 
only one single indicator. One of the common methodological concerns about single 
indicator measurements is that a single indicator may not be consistently valid or reli-
able across points in time, and in particular, across different cultures (or religions and 
denominations). 
To analyse denser time series and longer time spans, we cannot, however, easily use 
the information-rich ISSP Religion modules, as these have been conducted just three 
1 Much of the inspiration and a significant part of the data used in this chapter originate from a 
project initiated by Ferruccio Biolcati (University of Milan) and Christiano Vezzoni (University 
of Trento). We are also indebted to Urs Fichtner for his help in cleaning the data we added, a 
process which was not always as easy as it should have been.
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times in two decades. In such situations researchers most commonly fall back on non-
specialised sources (see Höllinger in this volume for another approach: retrospective 
reports across generations). The non-specialised source for the ISSP survey programme 
comes in the form of the standard ‘background variables’ collected with each ISSP sam-
ple, independently of the topic of the ISSP module. The frequency of personal church 
attendance is a mandatory item among these background variables. Thus, it will become 
the base for the following analysis.
Data and Methodological Problems
Respondents’ reports on the frequency of church attendance, aggregated to one sin-
gle value per country and point in time, were utilised to assess the level of religiosity 
characterising a given country at a given time. The chapters by Höllinger, Bechert, and 
Jagodzinski included in this volume make the case for using church attendance in this 
way. Starting from their reasoning, we arrive at the following – probably still incomplete 
– list of arguments: 
  Church attendance is an activity demanding both time and energy which could also 
be invested into other activities. Thus, it has a noticeable cost and incurring of costs 
is usually taken as indicating a commitment to something. So it can reasonably be 
said that the more often one attends church, the higher the personal commitment to 
that church.
  Frequent church attendance implies that an individual frequently receives religious 
messages or makes religious and spiritual experiences. Thus, the more often one 
attends church, the more exposure to religious content and experience one should 
have.
  Attending church is also a social activity. This fact increases the likelihood that a per-
son will meet other religious people, and this is particularly valid for frequent church 
goers, who convey their – probably religious – views and confirm one’s own – prob-
ably religious – views. Frequent church attendance should stabilise religious beliefs.
There are, of course, other ways to look at and to measure religiosity, and as demon-
strated particularly by Edlund in this volume, these other ways may lead to different and 
even contrasting inferences. Furthermore, church attendance is a meaningful concept 
only for religions that actually have churches. It is in fact a rather Christian concept.
The extended time horizon achieved by using the generic ISSP data comes at the price 
of limiting the number of countries covered, as the maximal time horizon is confined to 
those countries contributing data to the ISSP since the initial 1985/86 data collection. 
These countries are Australia, Austria, Italy, Germany (West), Great Britain, and the USA 
- all of them Western, predominantly Christian societies. Therefore, we can assume that 
church attendance is a meaningful concept for respondents in these countries, if we also 
assume that religiosity in these countries retains its Christian character even as declining 
levels of church attendance can be observed.
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Before discussing the results of the seemingly simple procedure of constructing a time 
series of the church attendance data, a few peculiarities of our database need be men-
tioned. The first issue is that ISSP members are basically free to use different question 
formats in the data collection for standard background variables (as ISSP often “piggy-
backs” on large national surveys that already have a national-specific standard set of 
demographics variables). Thus, for background variables the ISSP standard output is 
established only when national data collected with slightly different question texts and 
response categories is transferred into the common ISSP coding scheme. As a result there 
may be limits to the cross-national comparability of our church attendance data, since 
there is no strictly harmonised measurement instrument behind it.
Although church attendance is a standard ISSP background variable, the common 
coding scheme just explained has undergone some development over its 25 years in 
use.2 The current ISSP standard now prescribes a coding scheme with seven categories, 
an increase over the initial five categories of 1985, as illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1:  Church attendance target scales from 1985 to the present
Codes 1985 1986 1987 1988 - 2000 2001 - 
1 Once a week Once a week Once a week or 
more
Once a week or 
more
Several times a 
week or more 
often
2 One to three 
times a month
One to three 
times a month
One to three 
times a month
Two to three 
times a month
Once a week
3 Several times 
per year
Several times 
per year
Several times 
per year
Once a month Two or three 
times a month
4 Less frequently Twice per year, 
once per year
Twice per year, 
once per year
Several times 
per year
Once a month
5 Never Less frequently Less frequently Less frequently, 
but at least once 
per year
Several times 
per year
6 Never Never Never or less 
than once per 
year
Once per year
7 Less frequently 
than once per 
year
8 Never
2 The current ISSP standard also suggests that a question text like the following be used in the 
data collection, if countries are not bound by strong national requirements for an alternative 
text: “Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals, etc., how often do you attend 
religious services?”
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In an effort to exclude comparability problems, responses were collapsed for our analy-
sis into just two classes which were uniquely identifiable across all years: frequent and 
regular church attendance is displayed by those respondents reporting that they attended 
church at least once a week; all others are classified together as non-frequent participants 
or non-participants (including those who reported not being religious or not belonging 
to a denomination, who were not asked about their attendance in some countries).3 
 Another ISSP-specific problem is rooted in the organisational structure of the survey 
programme itself. As mentioned above, the ISSP questionnaires often are carried “piggy-
back” with larger, regular, general social surveys. While ISSP modules are meant to be 
carried out annually, general social surveys often follow a biannual schedule. A direct 
result is that in certain countries two ISSP modules having nominally different ‘ISSP 
years’ in their title are not infrequently surveyed simultaneously when the national 
general survey to which they are attached is administered only every other year. For 
example, in Germany, ISSP data will be collected along with the German general social 
survey “ALLBUS”, which follows a biannual schedule. This results in ISSP data from, 
for example, 2007 and 2008 having been collected in the same fieldwork campaign (but 
on different sub-samples), in this case in 2008. Similar cases occur in all countries of 
our small sample used. Correct fieldwork times were identified and assigned, and any 
samples where the background variables of adjacent ISSP modules had been surveyed 
on the same respondents were dropped. For the countries in our analysis, 101 independ-
ent samples remain. No country offers data for every single year from 1985 - 2010, but 
almost the full time span can be covered for all countries in our selection - give or take 
one year at the beginning or end of the period.
Results and Discussion
Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of respondents who report attending church ‘at least 
weekly’ in the six countries participating in ISSP surveys from the programme’s very 
beginning in 1985/86, up to the latest finalised module of 2010. Data were weighted 
when weights are available.
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, embedding the results of the other 
chapters into the longer trend information obtained here can be understood to mean that 
finding compatible results between our way of treating the data and the various ways 
chosen in the other chapters would support the substantive results presented there. Just 
the addition of more data points creates an impression of the reliability of the type of 
measures that were used throughout this book.
3 An alternative cutting point between frequent attenders and less frequent/non-attenders is 
above the category “once a month or more” (vs. all those with less frequent, or no attendance) 
as chosen by Höllinger and Jagodzinski (this volume). This does not change the structure of 
the results, but in our denser time series it produces more ambiguous classification decisions 
and fewer valid data points.
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Figure 1:  Mean percentage of respondents attending church at least weekly between 1985 and 
2010.
The first question to ask is whether the national samples of 1991, 1998, and 2008 used 
in the other chapters appear as ‘outliers’ from the general national trends that our denser 
time series show better than the previous chapters could. Simple visual inspection of 
the individual trend lines in Figure 1 will provide an answer. Among our six countries, 
only Australia displays a moderate outlier value for weekly church attendance in that 
sense; for 1998. Looking at all time-points, we find two additional – and more striking 
– outliers: Great Britain in 1993 and Austria in 2003. No straightforward explanations 
are available for these outliers. Theoretically, one factor behind such outliers could be 
singular events that affect the actual attendance behaviour, for example a national cri-
sis that drives people to churches in their search for orientation and mental support (to 
apply Edlund’s argument on a short-term basis). Other, unfortunately more likely, factors 
could be of a methodological nature, for example deviating measurement instruments 
for these specific samples, sampling problems, or even undetected coding errors made 
during the integration of the national samples into the international ISSP data file. All 
of the latter factors would more or less forbid using these particular data points. But for 
the present purpose, two reassuring conclusions can be drawn: First, the specific obser-
vations of church attendance means for the countries overlapping with Jagodzinski’s 
(Italy, USA) or Höllinger’s trend analyses (all six countries for ISSP 2008) are not visible 
outliers, therefore it seems unlikely that their analyses are biased by strong undesirable 
effects. Second, with the three exceptions named out of our 101 data points, the overall 
picture of the trend data is one of no or of small and rather continuous change from year 
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to year, increasing our confidence in the general usefulness of these data for describing 
change or stability on the societal level.
After having obtained some reassurance on the basic methodological side, we turn to 
a slightly more substantive question. Are the trend statements made for individual coun-
tries in the previous chapters confirmed? This is to be expected at least for the church 
attendances measures of Jagodzinski and Höllinger, even if these used a different clas-
sification of the responses than we did. In Höllinger’s case, a much longer time span is 
addressed (with an entirely different approach and only a subset of the data). The 1985-
2010 or 1991-2008 periods covered in the other analyses comprise only the most recent 
part of the longer trends that Höllinger tries to capture. Starting with our six countries, 
we find their observed trajectories between 1985/86 and 2010 remarkably similar to 
one another despite vastly different levels between Italy and the USA on the one hand, 
and Australia, Austria, Great Britain, and West Germany on the other. The important 
common feature is a moderate downward trend up to the late 1990s (increasing only 
for Australia), which then flattens out into near stability towards the end of the period 
(except for Australia, where the intermittent increase turns into a rather steep decrease 
again). Further, the ranking of our six countries with regard to mean attendance levels 
remains relatively stable over time. When countries do change ranks, it is mostly only 
over modest absolute distances. This lends some credibility to the rankings displayed in 
the chapters by Edlund, Smith, and Bechert.
The most direct comparison with Jagodzinski’s data on Italy and the USA displays no 
contradictions. For these countries, the long-term data confirm conclusions drawn previ-
ously on only three time-points. If we revert the perspective and look at how our data 
over 25 years fit into Höllinger’s estimates spanning approximately 60 years, it appears 
that the declining trends demonstrated by our data are the continuation of a process 
that – as theory claims – began much earlier. In all six cases, according to Höllinger’s 
analyses the attendance levels between 1940 and 1960 must have been markedly higher 
than around 1985.
In conclusion, it appears that the church attendance trend data that was presented 
in the preceding chapters matches nicely with our more detailed trend data, even if the 
overlap of countries in the analyses is small. This indicates that further thought should 
be given to those trend statements that were based on alternative indicators of religios-
ity. If the robustness of the church attendance estimates from the 1991, 1998, and 2008 
instances of the ISSP can be confirmed, there is, prima facie, little reason to assume that 
the measures for alternative indicators are less robust. Certain observations become even 
more interesting which – in contrast to church attendance behaviour – do not univer-
sally find relevant decreases in, for example, religious belief systems (Edlund) or some-
times even for alternative religious behaviours such as praying (Jagodzinski). Declining 
church attendance is a fact in most Western countries, most definitely for those we 
have examined in detail in the present chapter. Taking into account specific alternative 
aspects however, it is less clear what this means for religiosity at large.
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A.II Guide for the ISSP “Religion” Cumulation 
of the Years 1991, 1998 and 2008 
(ZA5070 and ZA5071)
This guideline is intended to give an overview on the contents, the structure and basic 
coding rules of the ISSP “Religion I-III” cumulation. Further, variable-related informa-
tion is available through the study documentation on ZACAT1.
The data release consists of two separate data files. The main file, ZA5070 “ISSP 
Cumulation Religion I-III”, contains only cumulated variables. That means it includes:
  all topic-related variables of the master questionnaires, so called module variables, 
which appear in at least two “Religion” modules and
  most of the so called background variables, mostly covering demographics, which 
appear in at least two “Religion” modules collected by
  all those ISSP member countries that participated in at least two “Religion” modu-
les (28 countries).
However, there are other, mainly national-specific background variables, which belong 
to the current ISSP standard, but cannot be cumulated for various reasons. Although not 
being comparative over time, these variables might still be useful for many analyses. 
Therefore they are integrated in a second data file with the study number ZA5071 “ISSP 
Cumulation Religion Add On”. ZA5071 is a separate data file going along with separate 
documentation on ZACAT. The contained variables, however, can be matched easily to 
the cumulated file if necessary.
The cumulation and its “Add On” file are based on the data of the integrated data 
files of the modules 1991 (ZA2150), 1998 (ZA3190) and 2008 (ZA4950). It does not go 
back to the individual country files of each module. A general rule is that the cumulated 
data follow the coding of the 2008 module as closely as possible, because this module 
represents the most updated ISSP standard. In terms of the background variables that 
means that whenever the module data allows it, the coding of the “The ISSP Background 
Variable Standard” set in 2001 (bv2001_20060425.pdf), is realized, again, as closely as 
possible. 
1 ZACAT (http://zacat.gesis.org) offers direct and comprehensive access to a variety of social 
science survey data with a focus on international comparative studies and election studies. 
It enables users to locate and search for appropriate studies, to analyse data online and to 
download data sets or subsets of them in different formats (among others SPSS, SAS, Stata). 
Access to ZACAT is free of charge, analysis and download requires registration.
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1  Countries
Over the three years the “Religion” surveys have been conducted, the following countries 
participated at least twice:
1991 1998 2008
Australia X X X
Austria X X X
Chile X X
Cyprus X X
Czech Republic X X
Denmark X X
France X X
Germany X X X
Hungary X X X
Ireland X X X
Israel X X X
Italy X X X
Japan X X
Latvia X X
Netherlands X X X
New Zealand X X X
Norway X X X
Philippines X X X
Poland X X X
Portugal X X
Russia X X X
Slovakia X X
Slovenia X X X
Spain X X
Sweden X X
Switzerland X X
United Kingdom X X X
USA X X X
For Germany as well as for the United Kingdom there are two subsamples available in the 
data for each year. In case of Germany one sample contains the West German respond-
ents and the other one the East German respondents. In case of the United Kingdom, the 
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two subsamples contain Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Eastern Germany as well as 
Northern Ireland are overrepresented in the integrated data files, which should be taken 
into account if either Germany or the United Kingdom are analysed as a separate unit.
2 Variables
Both data files contain a number of administrative variables:
The “Study number” (V1) and the “GESIS Archive Version” (V2) exactly indicate the 
data file at hand. The respondents’ ID-numbers (V3) are those of the integrated data files 
and have not been changed for better comparability of the cumulated with the integrated 
data of each individual module. However, the ID numbers are only unique within their 
respective country and year of the module. To provide a unique identification across the 
data files it is necessary to combine V3 and V7.
While V4 “Year” allows the splitting of the data by modules, variables V5 and V6 indi-
cate the countries. The “Country” variable (V6) offers codes for the country as a whole, 
whereas the “Country_Sample” variable (V5) specifies also the subsamples within certain 
countries. As a “cumulation specific” variable, V7 “Country_Sample_Year” combines the 
information of V5 and V4, prepared as a supporting tool for analysis. According to the 
current ISSP standard, the codes for all three variables which deal with country identifi-
cation make use of international three-digit “ISO 3166 Codes”. 
To match both datasets it is necessary to use the “ID” variable V3 as well as the “Coun-
try_Sample_Year” variable V7 as key variables.
Example for SPSS:
SORT CASES by V3 V7. /** use this on BOTH input files.
MATCH FILES 
/FILE=’put path of your data file here\ZA5070.sav’
/FILE=’put path of your data file here\ZA5071.sav’
/BY V3 V7.
EXECUTE.
2.1 Variables of the cumulated data file ZA5070 “ISSP Cumulation Religion I-III”
All module variables, which have been asked in at least two “Religion” modules, are 
included in the cumulated data file ZA5070. For a detailed overview on these variables 
see the correspondence list at Appendix I of this document.
Besides the module variables, ZA5070 contains the following background variables:
SEX, AGE, MARITAL, COHAB, EDUCYRS, DEGREE, WRKST, WRKHRS, ISCO88, WRK-
SUP, WRKTYPE, SELFEMP, NEMPLOY, UNION, SPWRKST, SPISCO88, HOMPOP, HHCY-
CLE, PARTY_LR, VOTE_LE, ATTEND, ATTEND_EXT, RELIGGRP, CLASS, nat_REG and 
WEIGHT
The “Region” variable (nat_REG) is the only national-specific variable that can be cumu-
lated over time, because the administrative divisions of regions did not change too much 
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over the years. According to the current ISSP standard it is split by country, but cumu-
lated over the module years.
2.2  Variables of the supplementary data file ZA5071 “ISSP Cumulation Religion 
Add On” 
The “ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On” data file ZA5071 contains all those background 
variables which cannot be cumulated for various reasons. The national-specific variables 
are all split by country as well as by module. A prefix of two ISO code letters indicates 
the country and a two-digit suffix the module year. 
  nat_DEG for the years 1991 and 2008
The national-specific DEGREE variables for 1998 do not appear in the data file, because 
in 1998 the countries were supposed to hand in a standardized DEGREE variable, which 
is not national-specific at all. For DEGREE 1998 see the cumulated variable in the cumu-
lated data file.
  National occupation variables (nat_OCC and nat_SOC) for 1991, when the ISCO 
scheme had not been established as a standard yet. Only Australia provided an 
ISCO code in 1991 that could be cumulated in the main file.
  Respondent’s income and Family income for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008 (nat_
RIN and nat_INC)
The income variables have been brought to the current ISSP standard. That means that 
for the earlier modules, original enumerated value codes for income categories are 
recoded into the midpoints of the classes for which they stand. These variables could 
now technically be cumulated. However, in some countries variables have been surveyed 
quite differently. Information varies widely, for example, whether the survey asked for 
income per month or year, before or after tax and in what currency. Last but not least, it 
is hardly useful to cumulate income data in a range of twenty years, without accounting 
for inflation. These are the reasons why we decided against cumulating these variables.
Germany is a special case. In 1991 information about the respondent’s and the fam-
ily’s income was collected in an open question (DE_RI91a/DE_IN91a). Since nonresponse 
on this question was very high it was additionally asked for income classes (DE_RI91b/
DE_IN91b). 
  nat_PRT for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008
  nat_SIZ for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008
  nat_ETH for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008
In addition to those national-specific variables, there are some variables that cannot be 
cumulated, because there is too much coding variation. These variables are available as 
well in the “ZA5071” file:
   URBRUR91, URBRUR98, URBRUR08
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As in the integrated data file, URBRUR91 remains unlabeled, because the information 
asked for within these variables differs too much across the countries. The country-
specific labels, however, are available through the documentation on ZACAT.
Other variables appear in their current form the first time in 2008 and therefore can-
not be cumulated: 
  TOPBOT08, MODE08, SUBSCA08, SPWRKT08
3 Missing Values
The “Religion” cumulation introduces three codes for missing values which do not appear 
in the integrated data files in this form. These codes specify certain missing cases in the 
cumulation explicitly:
-1 ‘Variable not available for this country in this module’
This missing value is coded in the event that a country did not provide the variable in 
question.
-2 ‘Country specific variable not applicable for this country’
This missing value is coded for national-specific variables, indicating the cases of the 
other countries. 
-3 ‘Variable not available in this module’
This missing value is cumulation-specific and is coded in the case of variables that are 
not part of a certain module at all. It is also coded, however, in the event that a variable 
cannot be cumulated and is therefore not available for this module in the cumulation 
file, but does appear in the “ZA5071” additional data file.
For reasons of consistency all missing values are coded into the negative range. So, 
those values which appear in the integrated data files as, for example, “8 Can’t choose” 
and “9 No answer” appear in the cumulated file as “-8 Can’t choose” and “-9 No answer”.
4 ISCO88/SPISCO88
With the exception of Australia, where ISCO88 and SPISCO88 are already available 
in 1991, these variables appear in the cumulated data file only for the years 1998 and 
2008. The mostly national-specific occupation codes and ISCO68 3-digit codes, which 
are available in the 1991 data for the other countries, cannot be cumulated. However, 
these variables are available in the additional data file “ZA5071”. 
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Occupation codes 1991:  2  3
ISCO 1991
Austria ISCO68 (3-digit)*
Germany ISCO68 (3-digit)*
Great Britain Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 1991
Hungary ISCO68 (3-digit)
Ireland List of occupations and the socio-economic group assigned to them
Israel Unspecified 1-digit code
Italy Unspecified 2-digit code
Netherlands No occupation code available
New Zealand ISCO68 (3-digit)
Northern Ireland Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 1991
Norway2 ISCO68 (3-digit)* and
Nordic Standard Classification of Occupation
Philippines Unspecified 2-digit code
Poland ISCO68 (3-digit)
Russia Unspecified 2-digit code
Slovenia3 ISCO88 (3-digit)
USA Census Occupation Code (1980)
*plus additional country specific codes
5 Additional information 
On ZACAT, under the option “Metadata” in the sidebars for the individual modules 
ZA2150, ZA3190 and ZA4950, there are links to different types of documents: the Study 
Descriptions for each national sample, provided by the individual countries, the origi-
nal national questionnaires, and the master questionnaire. Besides, for 2008 informa-
tion documents on the original coding of the background variables are available. The 
national-specific question texts for the cumulated background variables are available for 
ZA4950 (2008) through these documents, and for all variables through the individual 
module documentations on ZACAT. 
2 The Norwegian occupation variable for the spouse is only available as “Nordic Standard Clas-
sification of Occupation“.
3 The Slovenian occupation variable for the spouse is available as unspecified 2-digit code.
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2008 Religion Questionnaire – Final
 June, 2007 
1. If you were to consider your life in general these days, how 
happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole...
Very happy.......... 1   
Fairly happy........ 2 
Not very happy...... 3 
Not at all happy.... 4 
Can't choose........ 8 
2. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have 
sexual relations before marriage? 
Always wrong............. 1
Almost always wrong.. ....2
Wrong only sometimes.... .3
Not wrong at all......... 4
Can't choose............. 8
3. What about a married person having sexual relations with someone 
other than his or her husband or wife, is it... 
Always wrong............. 1
Almost always wrong...... 2
Wrong only sometimes..... 3
Not wrong at all......... 4
Can't choose............. 8
4. And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same 
sex, is it... 
Always wrong............. 1
Almost always wrong...... 2
Wrong only sometimes... ..3
Not wrong at all..... ....4
Can't choose............. 8
A.III 2008 Religion Questionnaire 
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5. Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to 
have an abortion ... 
                      Always     Almost     Wrong     Not  Can't 
                       Wrong     Always     Only     Wrong Choose 
                                 Wrong    Sometimes  at All 
a. If there is a strong 
    chance of serious 
    defect in the baby...1         2         3         4      8
b. If the family has a
   very low income and
   cannot afford any
   more children...      1         2         3         4      8
6. Do you agree or disagree... 
Neither
 Agree 
                      Strongly  Agree  nor    Dis-  Strongly  Can't 
                        Agree        Disagree agree Disagree Choose 
A husband's job is 
to earn money; a
wife's job is to
look after the
home and family ....      1       2       3      4      5        8
7. Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or 
that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
People can almost always be trusted      1 
People can usually be trusted       2 
You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people  3 
You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people 4 
Can't choose........        8 
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3
8. How much confidence do you have in ... 
1. Complete confidence 
2. A great deal of confidence 
3. Some confidence 
4. Very little confidence 
5. No confidence at all 
8. Can't choose 
PLEASE CIRCLE A NUMBER 
a. [Parliament].....  1 2 3 4 5   8 
   <use national legislature, e.g. U.S. Congress> 
b. Business and industry.... 1 2 3 4 5   8 
c. Churches and religious 
   organizations.............. 1 2 3 4 5   8 
d. Courts and the legal 
   system................  ....1 2 3 4 5   8 
e. Schools and the
   educational system....  ....1 2 3 4 5 8 
9. We are interested in the extent to which you have moved 
from one kind of place to another. Which do you think is 
most like your experience of life? 
I have lived in different countries     1 
I have lived in different places in the same country  2 
I have lived in different neighborhoods in the same place 3 
I have always lived in the same neighborhood    4 
10. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following... 
Strongly agree.............. ..1 
Agree...................... ...2 
Neither agree nor disagree.... 3 
Disagree...................... 4 
Strongly disagree............. 5 
Can't choose.................. 8 
                                    PLEASE CIRCLE A NUMBER 
a. Religious leaders
   should not try to
   influence how people 
   vote in elections... . 1     2     3     4     5     8 
b. Religious leaders should 
   not try to influence
   government decisions.  1     2     3     4     5     8 
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11. Please consider the following statements and tell me whether you 
agree or disagree..
Neither
 Agree 
                      Strongly  Agree  nor    Dis-  Strongly  Can't 
                        Agree        Disagree agree Disagree Choose 
                                                                          
a. Overall, modern
   science does more 
   harm than good......    1     2      3       4       5       8 
b. We trust too much in
   science and not 
   enough in religious 
   faith................   1     2      3       4       5       8 
c. Looking around the 
   world, religions
   bring more conflict 
   than peace...........   1     2      3       4       5       8 
d. People with very strong 
   religious beliefs are 
   often too intolerant of 
   others...........       1     2      3       4       5       8 
12. Do you think that churches and religious organizations in this 
country have too much power or too little power? 
Far too much power................. 1 
Too much power..................... 2 
About the right amount of power.... 3 
Too little power................... 4 
Far too little power............... 5 
Can't choose....................... 8 
13. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 Strongly 
 Agree
Agree Neithe
r
agree
nor
disagr
ee
Disag
ree
Strong
ly
Disagr
ee
Can’t
choose
a. All religious 
groups in [country] 
should have equal 
rights.
1 2 3 4 5 8 
b. We must respect 
all religions. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
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14. People have different religions and different religious views. 
Would you accept a person from a different religion or with a very 
different religious view from yours… 
1. Definitely accept,
2. Probably accept, 
3. Probably not accept,
4. Definitely not accept,
8. Can’t Choose 
  a. marrying a relative 
 of yours  1          2          3          4          8     
  b. being a candidate of 
   the political party you 
   prefer?  1          2          3          4          8 
15. There are some people whose views are considered extreme by the 
majority.  Consider religious extremists, that is people who believe 
that their religion is the only true faith and all other religions 
should be considered as enemies.  Do you think such people should be 
allowed to... 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE.
                    Definitely Probably Probably Definitely Can’t 
                   Not      Not     Choose 
a. Hold public meetings 
 to express their
 views?                  1         2        3        4         8 
b. Publish books
    expressing their 
    views?                  1         2        3        4        8 
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16. Please indicate which statement below comes closest to 
expressing what you believe about God. 
I don't believe in God..................  1 
I don't know whether there is a God and 
I don't believe there is any way 
to find out.............................  2 
I don't believe in a personal God, but 
I do believe in a Higher Power of 
some kind...............................  3 
I find myself believing in God some of 
the time, but not at others.............  4 
While I have doubts, I feel that I do 
believe in God..........................  5 
I know God really exists and I have no 
doubts about it.........................  6 
17. Which best describes your beliefs about God? 
I don't believe in God now and I never have....... 1 
I don't believe in God now, but I used to......... 2 
I believe in God now, but I didn't used to........ 3 
I believe in God now and I always have............ 4 
Can't choose...................................... 8 
18. Do you believe in 
                      Yes,        Yes,       No,       No,    Can’t 
                    Definitely  Probably Probably Definitely Choose 
....................          Not       Not  
a. Life after death. 1  2  3  4  8
b. Heaven........... 1  2  3  4  8
c. Hell............. 1  2  3  4  8
d. Religious miracles 1  2  3  4  8
e. Reincarnation – being 
reborn in this world again 
and again........... 1  2  3  4  8
f. Nirvana.......... 1  2  3  4  8
g. The supernatural powers 
of deceased ancestors 1      2  3  4  8
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19. Do you agree or disagree with the following... 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
8. Can't choose 
                                                                  
PLEASE CIRCLE A NUMBER
a. There is a God who concerns 
Himself with every human
being personally..............  1 2 3 4 5   8 
b.   There is little that people 
can do to change the course 
of their lives................  1 2 3 4 5 8 
c. To me, life is meaningful 
only because God exists.......  1 2 3 4 5 8 
d. In my opinion, life does not 
serve any purpose.............  1 2 3 4 5 8 
e. Life is only meaningful if 
you provide the meaning 
yourself......................  1 2 3 4 5 8 
f. I have my own way of connecting 
with God without churches
or religious services.    1 2 3 4 5 8 
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20. What was your mother's religious preference when you were a 
child? Was it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion? 
Protestant.............. 1 
Catholic................ 2 
Jewish.................. 3 
Orthodox (such as Greek 
  or Russian Orthodox)... 4
Muslim.................. 5 
Other (Please Specify) 
6
No religion............. 7 
Don't know.............. 8 
If Protestant: 
What specific denomination was that? 
_____________________________
______________________________________
<List in Qs. 20-23 may be modified to include all major religions in 
each country.> 
21. What was your father's religious preference when you were a 
child? Was it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion? 
Protestant.............. 1 
Catholic................ 2 
Jewish.................. 3 
Orthodox (such as Greek 
 or Russian Orthodox)... 4 
Muslim.................. 5 
Other (Please Specify) 
6
No religion............. 7 
Don't know.............. 8 
If Protestant: 
What specific denomination was that? 
_________________________________
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22. What religion, if any, were you raised in? Was it Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion? 
Protestant.............. 1 
Catholic................ 2 
Jewish.................. 3 
Orthodox (such as Greek 
 or Russian Orthodox)... 4 
Muslim.................. 5 
Other (Please Specify) 
_ 6
No religion............. 7 
Don't know.............. 8 
If Protestant: 
What specific denomination was that? 
________________________________________________
If you are currently married or living as married, answer Q. 23: 
If you are not currently married or living as married, 
go to Q. 24: 
23. What is your husband's/wife's religious preference? Is it 
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion? 
Protestant.............. 1 
Catholic................ 2 
Jewish.................. 3 
Orthodox (such as Greek 
 or Russian Orthodox)... 4 
Muslim.................. 5 
Other (Please Specify) 
6
No religion............. 7 
Don't know.............. 8 
If Protestant: 
What specific denomination is that? 
------------------------------------
<It is strongly recommended that the item on respondent's religion 
in the demographics use response categories fully compatible with 
those above.>
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24. When you were a child, how often did your mother attend 
.religious services? 
Never.........................  1 
Less than once a year.........  2 
About once or twice a year....  3 
Several times a year..........  4 
About once a month............  5 
2-3 times a month.............  6 
Nearly every week.............  7 
Every week....................  8 
Several times a week..........  9 
No mother/mother not present..  10 
Can't say/Can't remember......  98 
25. When you were a child, how often did your father attend 
.religious services? 
Never.........................  1 
Less than once a year.........  2 
About once or twice a year....  3 
Several times a year..........  4 
About once a month............  5 
2-3 times a month.............  6 
Nearly every week.............  7 
Every week....................  8 
Several times a week..........  9 
No father/father not present..  10 
Can't say/Can't remember......  98 
26. And what about when you were around 11 or 12, how often did you
attend religious services then? 
Never.........................  1 
Less than once a year.........  2 
About once or twice a year....  3 
Several times a year..........  4 
About once a month............  5 
2-3 times a month.............  6 
Nearly every week.............  7 
Every week....................  8 
Several times a week..........  9 
Can't say/Can't remember......  98 
<It is strongly recommended that the item on respondent's church 
attendance in the demographics use the same response categories as 
above.>
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Now thinking about the present... 
27. About how often do you pray? 
Never.........................  1 
Less than once a year.........  2 
About once or twice a year....  3 
Several times a year..........  4 
About once a month............  5 
2-3 times a month.............  6 
Nearly every week.............  7 
Every week....................  8 
Several times a week..........  9 
Once a day...................  10 
Several times a day..........  11 
28. How often do you take part in the activities or organizations of 
a church or place of worship other than attending services? 
Never.........................  1 
Less than once a year.........  2 
About once or twice a year....  3 
Several times a year..........  4 
About once a month............  5 
2-3 times a month.............  6 
Nearly every week.............  7 
Every week....................  8 
Several times a week..........  9 
29. For religious reasons do you have in your home a shrine, altar, 
or a religious object on display such as a (COUNTRY-SPECIFIC LIST 
icon, retablos, mezuzah, menorah, or crucifix)? 
Yes      1 
No      2 
30. How often do you visit a holy place for religious reasons such 
as going to [shrine/temple/church/mosque]?
Please do not count attending regular religious services at your 
usual place of worship, if you have one. 
Never      1 
Less than once a year   2 
About once or twice a year  3 
Several times a year   4 
About once a month or more  5 
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31.  Would you describe yourself as ... 
Extremely religious........... 1 
Very religious................ 2 
Somewhat religious............ 3 
Neither religious nor 
  non-religious............... 4 
Somewhat non-religious....... 5 
Very non-religious............ 6 
Extremely non-religious....... 7 
Can't choose.................. 8 
32. What best describes you: 
I follow a religion and consider
myself to be a spiritual person
interested in the sacred or 
the supernatural.                             1
I follow a religion, but don't 
consider myself to be a spiritual 
person interested in the sacred 
or the supernatural.                          2
I don't follow a religion, but
consider myself to be a spiritual 
person interested in the sacred 
or the supernatural.                          3 
I don't follow a religion and don't 
consider myself to be a spiritual
person interested in the sacred
or the supernatural.                          4 
Can’t choose                                  8 
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33. Which of the following statements come closest to your own 
views:
There is very little truth in any religion. 1 
There are basic truths in many religions.      2 
There is truth only in one religion.           3 
Can't choose........     8 
34. Do you agree or disagree that practicing a religion helps people 
to…
Neither
 Agree 
                      Strongly  Agree  nor    Dis-  Strongly  Can't 
                        Agree        Disagree agree Disagree Choose 
a. find inner peace
   and happiness     1       2      3      4       5      8 
b. make friends        1       2      3      4       5      8 
c. gain comfort in times of
   trouble or sorrow  1       2      3      4       5      8 
d. meet the right kind 
   of people            1       2      3      4       5      8 
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Optionals
1. Would you say that you have been "born again" or have had a "born 
again" experience -- that is, a turning point in your life when 
you committed yourself to Christ? 
O-18
Yes.................1
No..................2
2. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your   
     feelings about the Bible? 
O-18
a. The Bible is the actual word of God 
and it is to be taken literally, word 
for word............    1 
b. The Bible is the inspired word of God 
but not everything should be taken 
literally, word for word    2 
c. The Bible is an ancient book of fables, 
legends, history, and moral precepts 
recorded by man.....    3 
d. This does not apply to me   4 
e. Can't choose.....    8 
3 Has there ever been a turning point in your life when you made a 
new and personal commitment to religion? 
O-18 Previously a required item 
Yes.......1
No........2
4. During the last year, did you make some personal sacrifice as an 
expression of your faith such as by fasting, following a special 
diet, or giving up some activity during a holy season such as 
(Lent or Ramadan) <use examples that are appropriate for 
religions in your country>? 
New
Yes     1 
No     2 
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5. There are many different ways of picturing God.  We'd like to 
know the kinds of images you are most likely to associate with God. 
O-18
Below are sets of contrasting images.  On a scale of 1-7 where would 
you place your images of God between the two contrasting images? 
The first set of contrasting images shows Mother at 1 on the 
scale and Father at 7. If you imagine God as a Mother, you 
would place yourself at 1. If you imagine God as a Father, you 
would place yourself at 7. If you imagine God as somewhere 
between Mother and Father, you would place yourself at 2, 3, 4, 
5, or 6. 
Where would you place your image of God on the scale for each set of 
images?
    A. Mother                                               Father 
        01       02       03       04       05       06       07 
    B. Master                                               Spouse 
        01       02       03       04       05       06       07 
    C. Judge                                                Lover 
        01       02       03       04       05       06       07 
    D. Friend                                                King 
        01       02       03       04       05       06       07 
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6. Now please think about something different. Please check one box 
on each line below to show whether you think each statement is true 
or false. 
O-18
                  Definitely  Probably  Probably Definitely   Can't 
                    True        True     False     False     Choose 
a. Good luck charms 
 sometimes do bring 
 good luck.           1          2         3         4          8 
b. Some fortune tel- 
 lers really can fore- 
 see the future.....  1          2         3         4          8 
c. Some faithhealers
 do have God-given
 healing powers.....  1          2         3         4          8 
d. A person's star 
 sign at birth, or 
 horoscope, can af- 
 fect the course of 
 their future.......  1          2         3         4          8 
7. Suppose a law was passed which conflicted with your religious 
principles and teachings. Would you... 
O-8
Definitely follow the law....................  1 
Probably follow the law.......................  2 
Probably follow your religious principles.....  3 
Definitely follow your religious principles...  4 
I have no religious principles................  5 
Can't choose..................................  8 
8. What is your personal attitude towards members of the following 
religious groups? 
New
1. Very positive,
2. Somewhat positive,
3. Neither positive nor negative, 
4. Somewhat negative,
5. Very negative,
8. Can’t Choose 
a. Christians 1       2       3       4       5       8 
b. Muslims  1       2       3       4       5       8 
c. Hindus  1       2       3       4       5       8 
d. Buddhists  1       2       3       4       5       8 
e. Jews   1       2       3       4       5       8 
f. Atheists or
  non-believers 1       2       3       4       5       8 
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Notes on Question Wordings
In the above text "(  )" are parenthetical statements that will 
appear in the version administered to respondents. "[  ]" are used 
to show where appropriate, country-specific words will be inserted 
and the punctuations will be removed from the final text. "<   >" 
are special notes or instructions to follow. The punctuations and 
the statements themselves will be removed from the final text. 
Qs. 2-4 - "sexual relations" means "sexual intercourse". 
Q. 8 - "confidence" takes on several meanings, but having trust in 
is the main dimension. 
Q 8B - "Business and industry" - refers to large-scale businesses, 
but don't use an adjective like "big" in the translation. 
Q. 9 – By “neighborhood we mean the part of the town/city one lives 
in. If one lives in a village, we take this as your “neighborhood”. 
“Place” is a very flexible term, it can refer to anything from a 
rural locale to a large city. It generally means the smallest 
governing unit one resides in, such as a city, organized suburb, 
town, or rural district. 
Q. 12 - "churches and religious organizations" refers to the power 
of organized or institutional religions collectively. The question 
is whether overall religious organizations (e.g. the Catholic and 
Lutheran churches) have too much/too little power. 
Q. 14B – “prefer” refers to the political party that you favor or 
usually support or vote for 
Qs. Required: 16, 17, 19a, 19c, 19f and Optionals: 2, 5A-D, 6C: 
"God" refers to a supreme being. The term should refer to an entity 
rather than a non-sentient force. An encompassing, non-sectarian 
term is desirable if possible. 
Q. 16, response 3 - a “personal God” - a supreme being who cares 
about and is involved with individuals. This is a view of God in 
contrast to a deistic outlook. 
Q. 18F – “Nirvana” is a Buddhist concept that refers to the ultimate 
state transcending pain and desire in which individual consciousness 
ends.
Q 18G, 32 – “supernatural” refers to beyond the physical world, 
should conote things of a divine or transcendental nature. Avoid if 
possible, terms that refer mostly to entities like ghosts, 
poldergeists, elves, gremlins, etc. not associated with religion. 
Qs 20-23 - "preference" refers to the religion that a person favors 
or identifies with. If a person was born a member of one religion, 
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but then preferred or identified with another religion, this 
question asks about the latter. 
"religions" refers to major faiths or organized theological systems 
as opposed to "denominations" which are sub-divisions within a 
religion. What is important is that these questions distinguish all 
relevant faiths, religions, denominations, sects, etc. that exist in 
each country. 
Qs. 24-26 - "religious services" generally refers to organized, 
group worship activities like Muslims going to the mosque on 
Fridays, Catholic mass, attending church on Sundays for Protestants, 
etc. Private prayers at home would not normally count. 
Q. 29 – In general, list two or three examples that would be 
appropriate for the two or three largest religions in your country. 
If the country is religiously homogenous and only one type of 
religious object would be typical for that religion, a single 
example would suffice. However, we want to avoid creating the 
impression that we are referring only to religious objects relating 
to one particular religion. 
Q. 30 Note that this refers to a religious visit, thus sightseeing 
at a shrine, temple, church, tomb, etc. without a religious purpose 
would not count. In general, list two or three examples of holy 
places that would be appropriate for the two or three largest 
religions in your country. If the country is religiously homogenous 
and only one type of holy place would be typical for that religion, 
a single example would suffice. However, we want to avoid creating 
the impression that we are referring only to holy places relating to 
one particular religion. 
Q. 31 “extremely non-religious” – this does not mean anti-religious 
or attacking religion, but being without any religious feelings, 
beliefs, or behaviors. 
Q. 32 – see Q. 18G above. 
Q. 34A – “inner peace” – refers to a state of mental and spiritual 
serenity. One is calm and content and avoids or overcomes discord 
and anxiousness. 
Q. 34D – “right kind of people” – this would generally refer to good 
people, solid members of the community, people who would be good 
examples and potentially in a position of give assistance 
Optionals
Qs. 1 and 2 should be asked in countries with an appreciable number 
of Evangelical Protestants. They are not general questions to be 
asked in all countries. 
Qs. 3-8 are generally applicable for all countries. 
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Notes in Bold have been left in that describe the past history of 
the optionals. O-18, for example, means the item was included in the 
1991 and 1998 studies.
Optional Q. 1 - "born-again" - this refers to a specific type of 
spiritual experience in which people accept Christ as their personal 
Savior and are "born-again" as a Christian on the path to salvation. 
If your country has Baptist or Pentecostal sects, find what they use 
in your language(s) for this. It does not refer to "rebirth" in the 
sense of reincarnation. 
Optional Q. 2 - "Bible" should be used in all countries with 
predominantly Judeo-Christian heritage. Countries with adherents 
mostly from other religious traditions might either omit this item 
or replace “Bible” with the appropriate holy book. For example, a 
predominately Muslim country could rephrase the item in terms of the 
Koran.
"This does not apply to me." This code is largely for members of 
religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradition, but we want it to 
be flexible enough for other respondents to use it, if it seems 
appropriate to them. 
Optional Q. 3 - Q. 20 - "turning point" - a time or event in one's 
life when a change occurred resulting in a gaining of faith, 
becoming a believer, a rededication to one's religion or similar. 
Optional Q. 5 - "Master" is technically masculine in English, but is 
probably not seen in a highly gendered sense in this comparison. 
Carries the ideas of "master and servants" or an overlord. Someone 
who is in a position of social, economic, and political superiority. 
This item does assume a single Supreme Being and may not be 
appropriate in countries with polytheistic faiths. 
Optional Q. 8A – “Christians” collectively refers to followers of 
all churches associated with Christianity: Eastern Orthodox, 
Catholic, Protestant, Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist, etc. Similarly 
the other terms cover all sects or divisions within each of the 
listed major religions. 
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A.IV ZACAT
ZACAT is an online data portal which allows searching for, browsing, analysing and 
downloading social science survey data, including all ISSP modules. The data which can 
be accessed is a selection of the complete data available at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for 
the Social Sciences. 
ZACAT uses NESSTAR© technology and offers all the services of that technical plat-
form to its users: Apart from a direct download of datasets, it offers detailed documen-
tation on study as well as variable level and provides a direct access to further studies’ 
background material. Furthermore, it is possible to search for keywords that are either 
contained in the questions and answers of the questionnaires or in the variable or value 
labels of the datasets. This search is not limited to only one defined data file, but covers 
all survey data retrievable at ZACAT. Besides, ZACAT enables the user to execute first 
analyses on a limited basis, as for example frequencies distribution, cross tabulations 
and regressions. It is also possible to generate diverse charts for these analyses, such as 
pie or bar charts. A few examples are depicted below. Detailed usage instructions are 
available online via the ZACAT page and the NESSTAR help system.
The use of ZACAT and the data download is free of charge. For the analysis and 
download of data, a registration is required. However, the only prerequisite is that the 
usage of the data is for scientific purposes; therefore a short description of the project 
is requested. 
URL: http://zacat.gesis.org
Examples for analyses on ZACAT
(1)  Frequencies: Attendance of religious services in Andalucia, Spain
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(2)  Split file: Best description of one’s beliefs about God, listed by country, sample 
and year  
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(3)  Cumulated bar chart: Association between the political party affiliation on a left-
right spectrum and the religious main groups 
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A.V ISSP Modules
Year Module
1985 Role of Government I
1986 Social Networks I
1987 Social Inequality I
1988 Family and Changing Gender Roles I
1989 Work Orientations I
1990 Role of Government II
1991 Religion I
1992 Social Inequality II
1993 Environment I
1994 Family and Changing Gender Roles II
1995 National Identity I
1996 Role of Government III
1997 Work Orientations II
1998 Religion II
1999 Social Inequality III
2000 Environment II
2001 Social Networks II
2002 Family and Changing Gender Roles III
2003 National Identity II
2004 Citizenship I
2005 Work Orientations III
2006 Role of Government IV
2007 Leisure and Sports
2008 Religion III
2009 Social Inequality IV
2010 Environment III
2011 Health
2012 Family and Changing Gender Roles IV 
2013 National Identity III (in the field at the time of printing)
2014 Citizenship II (planned)
2015 Work Orientations IV (planned)
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A.VI ISSP Members and Participation
Country Year ´85 ´86 ´87 ´88 ´89 ´90 ´91 ´92 ´93 ´94 ´95 ´96 ´97 ´98 ´99 ´00 ´01 ´02 ´03 ´04 ´05 ´06 ´07 ´08 
Australia                   
Austria                   
Germany                   
Great Britain                    
United States                   
Italy                   
Hungary                   
Netherlands                   
Ireland                   
Israel                   
Norway                   
Philippines                   
New Zealand                   
Russia                   
Bulgaria                   
Canada                   
Czech Republic                   
Japan                   
Poland                   
Slovenia                   
Sweden                   
Spain                   
Cyprus                   
France                   
Portugal                   
Slovakia                   
Bangladesh                   
Chile                   
Latvia                   
Denmark                   
Brazil                   
Switzerland                   
Venezuela                   
Finland                   
Flanders                   
Mexico                   
South Africa                   
Taiwan                   
South Korea                   
Uruguay                   
Croatia                   
Dominican Republic                   
Korea                   
Argentina                   
Turkey                   
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ISSP Data Report
Religious Attitudes and Religious Change
Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt (eds.)
Das International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) erhebt jährlich Umfragedaten zu sozialwissenschaftlich relevanten 
Themen. Der vorliegende ISSP Data Report – Religious Attitudes and Religious Change beruht auf ISSP-Daten, die 
zu drei verschiedenen Zeitpunkten innerhalb von 17 Jahren in bis zu 42 Mitgliedsländern zu Einstellungen gegenüber 
Kirche und Religion im weitesten Sinne gesammelt wurden. Jedes Kapitel wurde von unterschiedlichen Autoren der 
ISSP-Gemeinschaft geschrieben und beleuchtet mit Hilfe der ISSP-Daten spezielle Aspekte religiöser Einstellungen 
und religiösen Wandels im internationalen Vergleich. In der Gesamtschau ergeben sich sowohl Einblicke in das religiöse 
Leben verschiedener Länder, als auch insbesondere Erkenntnisse zu den Einflussfaktoren religiösen Wandels innerhalb 
von fast zwei Dekaden.
The annual survey of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) provides data on topics relevant in social 
research. This current ISSP Data Report – Religious Attitudes and Religious Change examines data collected at three 
different points over 17 years, from up to 42 ISSP member countries, covering various facets of respondents’ attitudes 
towards Church and Religion. Individual chapters were written by different members of the ISSP community thereby 
offering a cross-national, comparative perspective on particular aspects of religious attitudes and religious change 
via ISSP data. Overall, this report offers insights into the religious landscapes of various countries and in particular 
information about the factors influencing the process of religious change over the past two decades.
